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 1 
Summary 
Any democratic State must to some extent take a stand on the classic 
democratic dilemma of how to approach anti-democratic forces in society. 
When the threat to democracy emanates from a political party, whose 
existence and functionality are central to modern democracies, the State will 
have to undertake a very delicate balancing exercise. The primary research 
question is what legal standard the Court has set up for the dissolution of 
political parties. Additionally, the aim is to compare that legal standard with 
the conception of democracy of the Council of Europe.  
 
To some extent, there is a common conception of democracy within the 
Council of Europe. It can be described as going well beyond a procedural 
model of democracy, but still emphasizing the importance of elections and 
therefore also of political parties. Furthermore, there appears to be some 
consensus as to what the general principles for the limits of dissolution of 
political parties should be. As an extremely intrusive measure that affects 
individual’s democratic participation, it should only be applied in 
exceptional cases and with utmost restriction. The European Court of 
Human Rights has over the years developed a test for assessing the legality 
of party dissolution measures, that in many ways sets a high threshold for 
the legality of such measures. However, its reasoning in especially the Refah 
Partisi case can be criticized for not adhering to, for instance, the 
democratic principles of tolerance and pluralism. 
 
The thesis concludes that it is not currently possible to give a clear answer 
to the research question. In some cases it is questionable whether the 
reasoning of the Court is in line with the conception of democracy within 
the Council of Europe. This is primarily due to the use of elusive concepts 
such as ‘democracy’, ‘pluralism’ and ‘secularism’. Acknowledging the 
difficulties of undertaking to clarify the concept of democracy, the author 
nevertheless suggests that the institutions of the Council of Europe should 
attempt to do so.  
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Sammanfattning 
Varje demokratisk stat måste i någon mån ta ställning till det klassiska 
demokratiska dilemmat om hur odemokratiska krafter i samhället bör 
bemötas. När demokratin hotas genom ett politiskt parti, vars existens och 
verkande är centrala i moderna demokratier, måste staten i fråga balansera 
motstående intressen. Den här uppsatsen handlar om praxis från 
Europadomstolen rörande upplösning av politiska partier. Frågeställningen 
är i första hand vilka gränser Europadomstolen har satt upp för sådana 
åtgärder. Dessutom är syftet var att jämföra domsolens praxis med 
Europarådets syn på demokrati. 
 
I viss utsträckning finns det en gemensam syn på demokrati inom 
Europarådet. Den kan beskrivas som mer långtgående än en substantiell 
demokratisk modell, som dock ändå lägger stor vikt vid val och följaktligen 
också vid politiska partier. Det verkar också finnas viss konsensus om de 
generella principer som bör gälla för upplösning av politiska partier. 
Eftersom det är en mycket ingripande åtgärd som påverkar individens 
demokratiska deltagande, kan den bara tillämpas ytterst restriktivt i 
undantagsfall. Europadomstolen har under årens lopp utvecklat ett test för 
bedömningen av huruvida en upplösning av ett politiskt parti är tillåtlig. 
Dock kan dess resonemang i särskilt fallet Refah Partisi kritiseras för att 
inte uppfylla demokratiska principer om till exempel tolerans och pluralism. 
 
Slutsatsen är att det för närvarande inte är möjligt att ge ett tydligt svar på 
frågeställningen. I vissa fall kan det ifrågasättas om Europadomstolens 
resonemang överensstämmer med Europarådets syn på demokrati. Detta 
beror främst på att domstolen använder förlitar sig på vaga termer såsom 
”demokrati”, ”pluralism” och ”sekularism”. Trots att begreppet demokrati 
svårligen låter sig definieras, föreslår författaren att Europarådet ändå bör 
försöka tydliggöra dess innebörd. 
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Preface 
Firstly, I would like to thank everybody who has been encouraging me and 
shown interest in my topic during this semester. Thanks in particular to 
Martin and Victoria for proof reading, and to Alejandro Fuentes for 
supervision. 
 
The elections to the European Parliament on the 25th of May 2014 made it 
clear that right-wing extremist parties are increasing in popularity 
throughout Europe. At least in Sweden, the debate on to what extent a 
democracy may take legal measures against parties with anti-democratic 
values appears to be almost non-existent. It is my firm belief that we all 
need to start reflecting on this delicate but fundamental question. Let us not 
forget the horrifying words of Joseph Goebbels: ‘This will always remain 
one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the 
means by which it was destroyed’. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The question of to what extent a ‘democracy’ may defend itself against 
forces aiming for its destruction is a classic dilemma. Can a democracy 
eliminate its enemies and still remain a democracy – or does it have to 
commit suicide in the name of tolerance? The answer to that question will 
inevitably depend on what democracy is taken to mean. Nevertheless, it is 
fairly safe to say that in democracies in Europe today, political parties play a 
central role.1 Thus, if the threat to democracy appears in the form of a 
political party, the question gets even thornier. The ultimate defence for 
democracy, then, would be to simply dissolve the party. For a long time, this 
was considered as a measure belonging to the age of the Cold War, the 
general view being that democracies punished crimes committed by 
individuals but that they did not prohibit parties.2 However, the 
phenomenon got increased attention in the field of European human rights 
law in the 1990s,3 perhaps due to a change in the nature of the threats to 
democracy. Today, parties are dissolved primarily because they incite hate 
and discrimination, because they encourage violence, or because they are 
perceived as threatening the identity of the state.4 Thus, the topic is highly 
relevant in contemporary Europe – not least in the light of extremist 
movements rising and decreasing trust in political parties.5 The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) summarized the 
issue as follows: 
 
The question of restrictions on political parties reflects the dilemma 
facing all democracies: on the one hand, the ideology of certain 
extremist parties runs counter to democratic principles and human 
rights, and on the other hand, every democratic regime must provide 
maximum guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly and association. Democracies must therefore strike a 
balance by assessing the level of threat to the democratic order in the 
country represented by such parties and by providing safeguards.6 
 
                                                
1 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), ‘Report on the 
Establishment, Organisation and Activities of Political Parties’ (12-13 December 2003) 
CDL-AD(2004)00G, para 13. 
2 Olgun Akbulut, ‘Criteria Developed by the European Court of Human Rights on the 
Dissolution of Political Parties’ (2010-2011) 34 Fordham Intl LJ 46, 46-47.  
3 Akbulut (n 2) 46. See also Gur Bligh, ‘Defending Democracy: A New Understanding of 
the Party-Banning Phenomenon’  (2013) 46 Vand J Transnatl L 1321, 1323-24. 
4 Bligh (n 3) 1337. 
5 See for instance Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Res 1754 (5 
October 2010) para 2.  
6 PACE Res 1308 (18 November 2002) para 3.  
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1.2 Purpose and Delimitations 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has dealt with about fifteen 
cases concerning the limits of States to dissolve political parties. The 
purpose of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, the aim is to clarify the legal 
standards for the dissolution of political parties as set out by the ECtHR. 
Secondly, the aim is to examine whether that standard is compatible with 
the conception of democracy in the Council of Europe (CoE). The second 
question is important not only because the approach to party dissolution 
theoretically affects the democratic character of a State, but also since 
democracy is the reference point for the legality assessment of a party 
dissolution. Article 11(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)7 requires that an interference 
with the freedom of association is ‘necessary in a democratic society’.8 
 
The purpose is certainly not to provide an answer to the ‘democratic 
dilemma’; that exceeds the scope of this thesis. Rather, the idea is to 
compare the case law of the ECtHR to one of the many conceptions of 
democracy – that of the Council of Europe. It would not be possible to give 
a full account of the debate on what democracy is. The thesis sets out with a 
brief general theoretical background, but the focus will be on the conception 
of democracy in the view of the institutions of the Council of Europe. 
Likewise, the relationship between democracy and international law in 
general will be touched upon, but only very briefly in order to outline the 
context of which the European system is a part. 
 
Furthermore, some delimitations follow from the terminology used. A 
definition of ‘political parties’ in this context has to take into account that 
the issue here concerns parties aiming to come to power. The European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) has used 
the following definition:  
 
‘[…][A] political party is an association with the task of presenting 
candidates for elections in order to be represented in political 
institutions and to exercise political power on any level: national, 
regional and local or on all three levels’.9  
                                                
7 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 
(adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS 5. 
8 Art 11 reads as follows: ‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for 
the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these 
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these 
rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State’. 
9 Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice in the Field of Political Parties’ (12-13 
December 2008 and 13-14 March 2009) CDL-AD(2009)021 para 10. The Venice 
Commission is an ‘independent consultative body’ which provides legal advice to Member 
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This is a suitable definition for this purpose, especially since States’ 
legislation in this area varies.10  
 
Moreover, ‘dissolution’ in this context is taken to mean the complete ban on 
a political party’s existence; refusal to register parties will not be 
considered. Likewise, consequences of the dissolution concerning for 
instance party members that loose their parliamentary seats fall outside of 
the scope of this thesis. Nor will the effects of such a measure on the party’s 
popularity or success be considered; the aim of this thesis is not to 
pronounce on the desirability of dissolution measures from a practical 
perspective. Minorities’ interest of an effective political participation is a 
subject closely linked to the present one, which will however not be 
examined. Likewise, comparative aspects of the legislation in various States 
will not be considered.  
 
1.3 Method and Material 
In order to determine what legal standard the ECtHR has set up regarding 
the dissolution of political parties, the case-law of the ECtHR is of course 
central. Thus, the main part of the thesis consists of a study of the cases 
concerning the dissolution of political parties within the framework of the 
ECHR, using a legal dogmatic method. I also take into account documents 
from PACE and the Venice Commission, which have also pronounced on 
the dissolution of parties. These documents are useful since they allow for a 
comparison of the view of the ECtHR and other institutions of the Council 
of Europe. The general principles for the dissolution of political parties as 
set out by PACE, the Venice Commission and the ECtHR will be presented 
together. This provides a background for the central part of the thesis, 
namely the application of those principles in the specific cases of the 
ECtHR.  
 
In light of the central role played by democracy in the case law of the 
ECtHR on the dissolution of parties, this thesis will examine what 
conception the Council of Europe has of democracy. As democracy 
constitutes the limit for when dissolution is allowed, it is necessary to clarify 
the term as much as possible. If the concept of democracy is unclear, the 
limit for the dissolution of political parties will consequently remain equally 
unclear. 
 
                                                                                                                        
States on matters relating to for instance democracy and the rule of law. See Committee of 
Ministers Res (2002) 3 (21 February 2002) (Revised Statute of the Venice Commission). 
10 Venice Commission, ‘Report on the Establishment, Organisation and Activities’ (n 1) 
para 13. See also Venice Commission, ‘Guidelines and Explanatory Report on Legislation 
on Political Parties: Some Specific Issues’ (12-13 March 2004) CDL-AD(2004)007rev., 
para 3; ‘Thematic Monitoring Report Presented by the Secretary General’ (19 October 
2005)  CM/Monitor(2005)1 Volume II para 2; Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice 
in the Field of Political Parties’ (n 9) para 58.  
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For this part of the thesis, I use Council of Europe treaties and ECtHR case 
law, but also for instance policy documents from PACE and guidelines 
issued by the Venice Commission. It should not be forgotten that the 
Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organization, and it might be 
perceived as misleading to talk about the view of the institutions of the 
Council of Europe themselves (with the exception of the ECtHR). However, 
although the legal value of the two latter types of documents is somewhat 
unclear, they could be seen as ‘soft law with “moral” authority’.11 The 
Venice Commission has described other legal sources than the case-law 
from the ECtHR as reflecting best practices that go further than minimum 
standards.12 As the aim is not provide a most likely non-existent legal 
definition of democracy, but merely to examine what elements the Council 
of Europe have in mind when they mention the word ‘democracy’, the value 
of those sources to this study is clear. 
 
In 1937, Karl Loewenstein coined the term ‘militant democracy’ to signify a 
democratic state taking legal measures to defend itself against anti-
democratic forces.13 The literature on the concept is rather extensive 
compared to the literature on the conception of democracy of the Council of 
Europe, which is quite scarce. Jure Vidmar’s article14 has been of some 
guidance. Gregory H Fox and Georg Nolte have written a debated and 
widely cited article on militant democracies; it appears in an edited book by 
Fox and Brad R Roth, which has been of great use.15  The works of Gur 
Bligh16 and Patrick Macklem17 have also been important sources as they 
provide a new perspective on militant democracy today. As regards 
literature on the dissolution cases in the ECtHR, it can roughly be divided 
into two groups: articles that focus on the Turkish cases altogether (for 
instance Olgun Akbulut18) and articles that focus on specific cases (for 
instance Kevin Boyle19).  
 
                                                
11 Hans-Heinrich Vogel, ‘Regulation of Political Parties – Guidelines, Codes and Opinions’ 
in Pieter van Dijk and Simona Granata-Menghini (eds), Liber Amoricum Antonio La 
Pergola (Juristförlaget i Lund 2009) 323, 324. 
12 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the Constitutional and Legal Provisions Relevant to the 
Prohibition of Political Parties in Turkey’ (13 March 2009) CDL-AD(2009)006, paras 11, 
41. See also Vogel (n 11) 325. 
13 Karl Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I’ (1937) 31(3) 
AmPolScRev (1937) 417; Karl Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental 
Rights, II’ (1937) 31(4) AmPolScRev 638. 
14 Jure Vidmar, ‘Multiparty Democracy: International and European Human Rights Law 
Perspectives’ (2010) 23 LJIL 209. 
15 Gregory H Fox and Georg Nolte, ‘Intolerant Democracies’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R 
Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2000) 389. 
16 Bligh (n 3). 
17 Patrick Macklem, ‘Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradox of Delf-
Determination’ (2006) 4 ICON 488; Patrick Macklem, ‘Guarding the Perimeter: Militant 
Democracy and Religious Freedom in Europe’ (2012) 19(4) Constellations 575. 
18 Akbulut (n 2). 
19 Kevin Boyle, ‘Human Rights, Religion and Democracy: The Refah Party Case’ (2004) 
1(1) Essex Human Rights Review 1. 
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1.4 Structure 
In order to present the material as clearly as possible, chapter 2 deals with 
the conception of democracy within the institutions of the Council of 
Europe. This chapter will provide for a background to the following 
chapters. Chapter 2 can also be seen as the most ‘general’ chapter, whereas 
chapter 3-4 will gradually go into depth on one specific issue related to 
democracy, namely, the dissolution of political parties. Thus, chapter 3 
accounts for the opinions of the Venice Commission and PACE on the 
dissolution of political parties, and also the general principles to be applied 
in those cases according to the ECtHR. Chapter 4 is the central part of the 
thesis, focusing specifically on the cases from the ECtHR and what limits 
the ECtHR has dictated for the dissolution of political parties. At the end of 
each chapter, some concluding remarks will serve as a foundation for the 
concluding chapter at the end. 
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2 Human rights and democracy 
2.1 Introduction 
In democratic societies that make use of the system of political parties in 
order to enforce popular sovereignty, the issue of anti-democratic parties is a 
difficult one. This is because the parties are in these cases the very 
foundation for democracy, which means that any interference with their 
freedom will risk also harming democracy as a whole. On the one hand, 
there is a strong argument to be made in favour of the majority principle and 
popular sovereignty. If the democratic system does not consider the opinion 
of the majority as decisive, is it really democratic? On the other hand, it is 
not self-evident that a democratic system automatically should have the 
capacity to destroy itself; if the principle of popular sovereignty is so 
important, how come it can deny future generations access to the same 
principle?20  
 
Thus, it is clear that the questions of dissolution of political parties and 
democracy are strongly interconnected. But in order to approach the issue of 
political parties, it is still necessary to clarify what democracy actually 
means. Otherwise it will be impossible to assess in what situations anti-
democratic parties threaten democracy and when they do not.  
 
This chapter will start with a brief account of conceptions of democracy, 
particularly the notions of ‘procedural’, ‘substantive’ and ‘militant’ 
democracy. These notions provide for different approaches towards the 
concept of democracy that can further the understanding of the view taken 
by the Council of Europe. This is also the rationale behind including a short 
section on the relationship between international law and democracy.   
 
The main part of this chapter examines what conception of democracy may 
be discerned from the documents of the Council of Europe institutions. The 
thesis starts with the ‘political’ institutions and finishes with the ECtHR, 
which has, in party dissolution cases, pronounced generally on the elements 
and characteristics of democracy. Rather than defining democracy, the 
ECtHR can be said to have focused on certain aspects of the concept and 
emphasized principles without elaborating much on them.21 From these 
fragments, it is still possible to discern an idea of liberal democracy where 
elections, the rule of law and human rights are central elements.22  
 
 
                                                
20 Fox and Nolte (n 15) 395-396. 
21 Boyle (n 19) 8. 
22 Boyle (n 19) 8. See also Yigal Mersel, ‘The Dissolution of Political Parties: The Problem 
of Internal Democracy’ (2006) 4 ICON 84, 91-95. 
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2.2 Notions of Democracy: Procedural, 
Substantive or Militant?  
At the outset, it has to be acknowledged that a classification of different 
notions of democracy risk to be misleading. The question ‘What is 
democracy?’ is not easily answered.   Political scientist James L Hyland 
points out that the question is ‘deceptively simple’, as there is in fact 
nothing to suggest that there is ‘some objective, timeless essence of 
democracy’. He also notes that democracy is often taken as a ‘sortal’ 
concept, so that a given political system could clearly be said to either fall 
inside the democracy ‘category’ or outside of it. However, it would also be 
possible to think of democracy as a ‘scalar’ concept, so that the political 
system could be considered more or less democratic.23 PACE has 
recognized this ever-changing nature of democracy: 
 
Democracy is never perfect but always evolving towards perfection; 
democracy is not a mere set of laws and institutions, but a way of 
thinking and living, and therefore it should grow naturally, without it 
being possible to export it or to transfer it mechanically from one 
place to another; democracy is not immutable but in constant 
evolution.24 
 
The notions presented below should thus not be taken as static concepts that 
has to be chosen from. Rather, they represent ideas of possible approaches 
to the issue. Furthermore, they do not aspire to constitute a comprehensive 
overview; there are an almost endless variety of theories on the definition of 
democracy. Instead, they are possible approaches to a specific democratic 
problem – that of anti-democratic parties. Fox and Nolte argue that the 
number of possible responses to that specific problem is limited, and 
conclude that eventually, the issue can be boiled down to two models of 
democracy: a procedural one and a substantive one.25 
 
The procedural model formed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in 
a time when individuals were perceived as capable of reasoning and 
enlightenment themselves. Protection from non-rational ideas by the State 
was thus considered unnecessary. However, democracy had to be tolerant in 
order to prevent the success of groups advocating the return to religious 
authority. This self-criticism was primarily carried out through electoral 
politics.26 Inevitably, this tolerance also meant that democracy could abolish 
itself.27  
                                                
23 James L Hyland, Democratic theory: The philosophical foundations (Manchester 
University Press 1995) 37, 45, 49-50. 
24 PACE Res 1407 (8 October 2004) para 12.  
25 Fox and Nolte (n 15) 405. See also Vidmar (n 14) 211-215. 
26 Fox and Nolte (n 15) 400-401. 
27 ibid 401. It could also be argued that this definition of democracy automatically goes 
beyond a mere focus on elections, requiring for instance freedom of expression, see Vidmar 
(n 14) 212-213. 
 12 
 
The substantive model, on the contrary, points out that majorities are not 
static; depending on which issue is at stake, they will consist of different 
constellations of citizens. But in order for citizens to be able to form those 
different constellations, they need a core of rights that secures political 
participation. Democratic procedure is thus merely a means of creating 
essential rights for citizens, and not an end in itself.28 These rights are not 
absolute in the sense that they cannot abolish themselves or other rights. The 
principles of justice that constitute the foundation of democracy would be 
meaningless if they could eliminate themselves.29 
 
The distinction between procedural and substantive democracy could be 
criticised for assuming that the government is democratic and the opposition 
undemocratic. Taking the distinction between procedural and substantive 
democracy used by Fox and Nolte as a point of departure, the different sides 
may adhere to different models or indeed interpret the same model in 
different ways.30 If both sides argue that they are democratic, the discussion 
will in the end be about which model of democracy is desirable.31  
 
The ‘militant’ model of democracy takes the substantive model as a starting 
point. The growth of non-democratic regimes after World War I really put 
the issue of anti-democratic groups on the agenda among democratic 
theorists.32 In the context of fascism spreading in Europe, Loewenstein 
argued that democracy had to become militant and protect itself in order to 
survive. Fascist technique was successful because democracy allowed it to 
be; ‘democracy and democratic tolerance have been used for their own 
destruction’.33 
 
The Weimar constitution illustrates this.34 The constitution gave the 
executive branch the power to dissolve the legislature and declare a state of 
emergency in order to protect democracy. Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution (the ‘suicide clause’) provided that the executive could 
legislate in case of emergency, which was exactly what Hitler did when he 
banned all opposition parties in 1933.35 
 
Loewenstein held that States ought to learn a lesson from the overly tolerant 
Weimar Republic. He even concluded that States had become ‘militant’ by 
                                                
28 Fox and Nolte (n 15) 401 
29ibid. 
30 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Whose Intolerance, Whose Democracy?’ in Fox and Roth (eds) (n 
15) 436-437.  
31 ibid 436-437; Brad R Roth, ‘Democratic Intolerance: Observations on Fox and Nolte’ in 
Fox and Roth (eds) (n 15) 441, 441-442. 
32 Fox and Nolte (n 15) 399-400. 
33 Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I’ (n 13) 422-423.  
34 ibid 426. 
35 Judith Wise, ‘Dissent and the Militant Democracy: The German Constitution and the 
Banning of the Free German Workers Party’ (1998) 5 University of Chicago Law School 
Roundtable 301, 305, 308. 
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adopting anti-fascist legislation.36 However, it was not until after World 
War II that States began to introduce provisions aimed at protecting 
democracy at a larger scale.37 For instance, the post-war German 
constitution allows the State to protect democracy.38 
 
The original conception of a ‘militant democracy’ thus focused on parties 
that were expressly aiming at entirely abolishing democracy, such as Fascist 
or Communist parties.39 This has been taken to mean procedural democracy; 
parties that do not want elections.40 Today, the threats to democracy have 
changed; instead, parties advocating discrimination, violence, terrorism, 
hate or religious fundamentalism have emerged.41 Perhaps that is why the 
concept of militant democracy has reached more attention recently.42 
Militant democracy has even been described as an emerging ‘new archetype 
of statehood’ which challenges traditional conceptions of democracy.43 It 
can also be argued that the purpose of restrictions of parties has changed; 
instead of protecting democracy as a whole, they aim at denying some 
parties legitimacy and benefits.44 In other words, the parties concerned are 
perceived as a threat to ‘certain elements within the liberal constitutional 
order’, for instance the principle of non-discrimination or secularism.45 The 
reason for this development is arguably due to the ambiguity of the concept 
of democracy.46 That ambiguity is to a large extent also due to the rather 
unclear status of democracy within international law. 
 
2.3 Democracy and International Law 
The right to political participation can be found in Article 21(3) UDHR and 
Article 25.47 Those provisions do not, however, contain any explicit 
definition of democracy but focuses on elections. Democracy is only 
mentioned in connection with the limitation clause in Article 29(2) UDHR 
and Articles 14, 21-22 ICCPR, without any explicit definition being 
provided.48 The reason is perhaps that during the Cold War, ‘democracy’ 
was used in human rights law as signifying only majoritarian elections,49 
                                                
36 Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I’ (n 13) 426, 430-431; 
Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II’ (n 13) 656. 
37 Macklem, ‘Militant Democracy’ (n 17) 488. 
38 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 20(1), 21(2). 
39 Bligh (n 3) 1325, 1333. 
40 Macklem, ‘Guarding the Perimeter’ (n 17) 575; Bligh (n 3) 1330. 
41 Macklem, ‘Guarding the Perimeter’ (n 17) 576; Bligh (n 3) 1325. 
42 Macklem, ‘Guarding the Perimeter’ (n 17) 576; Bligh (n 3) 1336. 
43 Macklem, ‘Guarding the Perimeter’ (n 17) 576. 
44 Bligh (n 3) 1325, 1335-36, 1366. 
45 ibid 1345, 1350. See also Macklem, ‘Guarding the Perimeter’ (n 17) 575.  
46 Macklem, ‘Guarding the Perimeter’ (n 17) 575. 
47 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 
A(III) (UDHR); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
48 Cf UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 25 (57)’ (27 August 1996) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7. 
49 Fox and Nolte (n 15) 397-398; Boyle (n 19) 8. 
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whereas ‘human rights’ were treated separately.50 This separation has to 
some extent remained; references are thus often made to both democracy 
and human rights at the same time.51 Today, however, the mutually 
reinforcing relationship between democracy and human rights is well-
established at the international level.52  
 
Democracy was long seen as a domestic issue, which should not be the 
subject of international law. It was not until after the Cold War that 
democracy started to receive increased attention from legal scholars 
concerned with international law.53 No common definition has been agreed 
upon, but elections appear to be central to most international actors.54 Fox 
and Nolte even contend that there is an emerging international consensus on 
the issue. Their examination of treaties, decisions from human rights bodies 
and State practice points to a firm support for a substantive view on 
democracy.55 
 
In the 1990s, it was even suggested that a right to democratic governance 
was beginning to take form.56 This remains a controversial statement which 
has been widely debated.57 The tension is quite apparent. On the one hand, 
defining democracy is a controversial issue since it would not be possible to 
find one definition that would suit all States.58 Furthermore, the adherence 
to the principles of the sovereignty of States and non-intervention works as 
a counter force.59 Resolutions from the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) concerning the subject have been quite cautious and for instance 
not mentioned multiparty elections at all.60 On the other hand, democracy 
                                                
50 Fox and Nolte (n 15) 397-398. 
51 ibid 398. 
52 See for instance ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ World Conference on 
Human Rights, (Vienna 14-25 June 1993) (12 July 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23, para 8; 
UNGA, ‘Letter dated 17 December 1996 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the General Assembly’ (20 December 1996) UN Doc A/51/761 (‘Agenda for 
Democratization’) para 15; Boyle (n 19) 8; Report of the Secretary-General, ‘In Larger 
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’ (2005) UN Doc 
A/59/2005 (‘In Larger Freedom’) paras 14-17. 
53 Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth, ‘Democracy and International Law’ (2001) 27 Rev Intl 
Stud 327, 327. 
54 Fox and Nolte (n 15) 396-397; Fox and Roth (n 53) 331. The importance of periodic and 
free elections has been emphasized by inter alia the UN Human Rights Committee in 
General Comment 25 (n 48) and the ECtHR in United Communist Party of Turkey and 
Others v Turkey App No 19329/92 (ECtHR, 30 January 1998) para 44. 
55 Fox and Nolte (n 15) 433-434. 
56 Thomas M Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AJIL 46. 
See also UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) Res 1999/57 (1999) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1999/L.11/Add.5. 
57 See eg Roth (n 31) 441; Susan Marks, ‘What has Become of the Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance?’ (2011) 22 EJIL 507; Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Rise and Fall of 
Democracy Governance in International Law: A Reply to Susan Marks’ (2011) 22 EJIL 
549. 
58 ‘Agenda for Democratization’ (n 52) paras 3-4, 10, 21, 122. 
59 ibid paras 8, 27. 
60 Vidmar (n 14) 219. See eg UN General Assembly (UNGA) Res 43/157 (8 December 
1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/157; UNGA Res 49/30 (22 December 1994) A/RES/49/30; 
UNGA Res 66/285 (12 July 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/285. 
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has gained more and more support both in theory and practice.61 It is no 
longer only connected to human rights but to concepts such as security, 
development and justice.62 Thus, in 2005, the UN Secretary General 
(UNSG) even described the development as moving towards a universal 
right to democracy.63 
 
It has also been suggested that democracy would be a decisive factor when 
it come to the recognition of States and governments. One of the reasons for 
the increasing importance of democratic legitimacy is probably that States 
have coordinated themselves through international organisations, a few of 
which require their members to be democratic.64 The Statute of the Council 
of Europe is one of them.65  
 
2.4 The Conception of Democracy within 
the Council of Europe 
2.4.1 General Considerations 
Both the Statute of the Council of Europe and the ECHR refer to democracy 
and its connection to human rights.66 However, neither provides for a 
definition, as the States Parties could not reach an agreement.67 Still, 
Articles 8-11 require that any interference with the freedoms prescribed by 
those articles be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Article 3 Protocol I to 
the ECHR is also related to the issue as it recognizes the right to free 
elections.68 The ECtHR has somewhat clarified the meaning of a 
‘democratic society’ in its case law,69 as have PACE. Additionally, the 
Venice Commission has contributed to the elucidation of the concept. It was 
established in 1990 by 18 Council of Europe States, with the purpose of 
creating ‘a fundamental instrument for the development of democracy in 
Europe’.70 The Commission is an advisory body with the objective of, inter 
alia, ‘promoting the rule of law and democracy’ and ‘examining the 
problems raised by the working of democratic institutions and their 
reinforcement and development’.71  
                                                
61 ‘Agenda for democratization’ (n 52) paras 2-3, 7, 26, 56. 
62 ibid paras 15, 16, 118; ‘In Larger Freedom’ (n 52) paras 127-128. 
63 ‘In Larger Freedom’ (n 52) paras 148-149. 
64 Sean D Murphy, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and 
Governments’ (1999) 49 ICLQ 545, 555. 
65 ibid 555; Statute of the Council of Europe (adopted 5 May 1949, entered into force 3 
August 1949) 87 UNTS 103 (CoE Statute) art 3.  
66 CoE Statute (n 65) preambular para 3, art 1(b); ECHR (n 7) preambular paras 4-6. 
67 Hans-Martien ten Napel, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Political Rights: 
The Need for More Guidance’ (2009) 5 EuConst 464, 464. 
68 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11 (adopted 20 March 1952, entered into force 18 
May 1954) ETS 5 art 3. 
69 See  text to n 154-206. 
70 Committee of Ministers Res (90) 6 (10 May 1990) preambular para 5.  
71 Revised Statute of the Venice Commission (n 9) Art 1.1. 
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In general terms, democracy constitutes one of the three ‘areas of 
excellence’ of the Council of Europe, together with human rights and the 
rule of law.72 These three concepts are intimately related; PACE has 
described democracy as the only political model which guarantees also 
human rights and the rule of law.73 Democracy is also considered as related 
to various other concepts, such as peace and stability, pluralism, free 
elections, parliamentarianism, freedom of opposition, cultural diversity, an 
independent media and a system of checks and balances.74 Although 
maintaining that there is a common view on the notion of democracy,75 
PACE also acknowledges the ‘diversity of the organisation of democratic 
institutions in Europe’.76  
 
This diversity is perhaps also the reason why no comprehensive document 
on the democratic principles common to the Council of Europe States has 
yet been created. On a number of occasions, PACE has asked the 
Committee of Ministers to draw up a list or charter on democratic principles 
and standards.77 The Venice Commission has expressed its willingness to 
contribute, stating that guidelines on democratic standards could contribute 
to the legitimization of international support concerning democracy in 
Europe.78 However, the Commission also cautioned that considering the 
diversity of democratic systems, it would be a difficult project. 
Formulations on democratic principles would thus have to reflect the 
minimum standards for a democracy adhering to the rule of law.79 Although 
agreeing with the Venice Commission on the probable usefulness of 
democratic standards, the Committee of Ministers has been more hesitant.80  
 
PACE has maintained the need for a list of democratic standards, especially 
in the light of the challenges facing democracy today. As participation in 
elections, and the trust for the democratic system, decreases, there is a need 
                                                
72 PACE Res 1547 (18 April 2007) para 27. See also Committee of Ministers, ‘Future of 
Democracy: Strengthening Democratic Institutions: Parliamentary Assembly Recom-
mendation 1629 (2003)’ (8 July 2004) CM/AS(2004)Rec1629 paras 2-3. 
73 PACE Res 1353 (25 November 2003) para 5; Committee of Ministers, ‘Future of 
Democracy’ (n 72) para 2.  
74 PACE Res 650 (27 January 1977) para 2; ‘Vienna Declaration’ Council of Europe 
Summit (Vienna 8-9 October 1993) (9 October 1993) para 1; PACE Res 1353 (n 73) paras 
1, 13; Committee of Ministers, ‘Future of Democracy’ (n 72) para 2; PACE Res 1547 (n 
72) paras 52-53; PACE Res 1747 (23 June 2010) para 3, 8; PACE Res 1754 (n 5) para 7. 
75 PACE Res 1747 (n 74) para 3. See also ‘Vienna Declaration’ (n 74) para 1.  
76 PACE Res 1747 (n 74) para 9. 
77 PACE Rec 1629 (25 November 2003); PACE Rec 1680 (8 October 2004) para 3.3; 
PACE Rec 1791 (18 April 2007) para 20. 
78 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the Possible Follow-Up to Parliamentary Assembly 
Recommendation 1629 (2003) on “Future of Democracy: Strengthening Democratic 
Institutions”’ (12-13 March 2004) CDL-AD(2004)015, para 17. 
79 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the Possible Follow-Up’ (n 78) paras 8-11. 
80 Committee of Ministers, ‘Future of Democracy’ (n 72) para 5; Committee of Ministers, 
‘New Concepts to evaluate the State of Democratic Development: Parliamentary Assembly 
Recommendation 1680 (2004)’  (6 April 2005) CM/AS(2005)Rec1680 final, para 6. 
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to redefine the core elements of democracy.81 Therefore, the Assembly 
suggested a list of democratic standards to complement the Council of 
Europe’s ‘traditional standards (…), such as the various individual 
freedoms, free and fair elections, the separation of powers, the checks and 
balance’s of the State’s institutions, etc.’82 The additional standards concern 
everything from transparency and accountability of State institutions to 
economic development and prison conditions.83 Notably, ‘measures for the 
protection of democracy against non-democratic initiatives’ was suggested 
as a standard.84 
 
Returning to the present conception of democracy within the Council of 
Europe, three specific aspects are presented below.  
 
2.4.2 Political Parties and Elections: Essential 
Elements of Democracy 
The Venice Commission has described human rights, the rule of law and 
democracy as the ‘three pillars of the European constitutional heritage’.85 
Democracy is considered inconceivable without elections.86 Political parties 
are therefore a ‘permanent feature of modern democracies’.87 Thus, a part of 
the constitutional heritage consists of an ‘electoral heritage’, which 
comprises a number of principles that make elections democratic.88 The 
principles of ‘universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage’ constitute 
this ‘electoral heritage’.89 In addition to those principles, elections also have 
to take place at ‘regular intervals’.90 That heritage also contains the principle 
that essential requirements of a democratic State based on the rule of law 
have to be fulfilled in order for elections to be genuinely democratic.91 This 
means that respect for human rights is one of the conditions necessary for 
                                                
81 PACE Res 1353 (n 73) para 4; PACE Res 1407 (n 24) para 2. This need is probably 
reinforced by what PACE has called a ‘crisis of democracy’ that is exacerbated by the 
world economic crisis. Symptoms are decreasing participation in elections and increasing 
extremism. See PACE Res 1746 (23 June 2010) para 1; PACE Rec 1928 (23 June 2010) 
para 1.  
82 PACE Res 1407 (n 24) para 9.  
83 ibid para 9.  
84 ibid para 9.18. 
85 Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (adopted 16 October 
2002) CDL(2002)139, para 12.  
86 Committee of Ministers, ‘Declaration on the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters’ 
(13 May 2004) Decl-13.05.2004/1E, preambular para 3.  
87 PACE Res 1546 (17 April 2007) para 4. See also Venice Commission, ‘Guidelines on 
Prohibition and Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous Measures’ (10-11 December 
1999) CDL-INF (98) 14, para 4. 
88 Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters’ (n 85) para 12.  
89 ibid paras 5, 32. See also PACE Res 1320 (30 January 2003) para 1; Committee of 
Ministers, ‘Declaration on the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters’ (n 86) 
preambular para 4. 
90 Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters’ (n 85) para 5; 
Committee of Ministers, ‘Declaration on the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters’ (n 
86) preambular para 5. 
91 Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters’ (n 85) para 12. 
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the implementation of those principles.92 Especially freedom of expression 
and of the press, freedom of movement and freedom of assembly and 
association (including political parties) are prerequisites for democratic 
elections.93 
 
The Venice Commission has, in a quite a detailed manner, specified the 
content of the principles just mentioned.94 The Commission described them 
as minimum standards that are defined from the interpretation of the five 
principles.95 In this way, democracy can be ‘expressed in different ways but 
within certain limits’.96 For the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to observe 
that as concerns the electoral heritage of Europe, there appears to be a strong 
consensus on what it entails.  
 
PACE has held that democracy includes the principles of ‘equality, 
dialogue, co-operation, transparency and the fight against corruption’.97 The 
principle of equality between parties is essential, as elections are central in 
order for parties to achieve their aim of participating in public life.98 The 
right to form a political opposition99 is also essential to democracy. As 
political parties are crucial for the relationship between citizens and 
democratic governance, they have a certain responsibility.100 The legitimacy 
of the entire democratic process depends on the legitimacy and credibility of 
the political parties, and it may be affected by dysfunctional parties.101 In 
this context, it may be noted the both PACE and the Venice Commission 
have considered the internal democracy of parties to be a factor capable of 
strengthening democracy in general.102 
 
At the same time, PACE has acknowledged that there is not one type of 
electoral system that is preferred in general; different countries need 
different systems.103 The aim of PACE is thus not to promote a single 
electoral system but to ‘establish a common understanding of principles 
which qualify elections as “free and fair” in compliance with democratic 
standards irrespective of the type of electoral systems’.104 In general, 
                                                
92 ibid paras 9, 12, 24. 
93 ibid para 9. See also PACE Res 1264 (8 November 2001); PACE Res 1619 (15 June 
2008) para 5; PACE Res 1705 (27 January 2010) paras 5, 9. 
94 Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (n 85) paras 12-23. See 
also Venice Commission, ‘Europe’s Electoral Heritage’ (14 March 2002) CDL(2002)7 rev. 
95 Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (n 85) para 32.  
96 ibid.  
97 PACE Res 1546 (n 87) paras 10, 13.1.1. 
98 Venice Commission, ‘Guidelines and Explanatory Report’ (n 10) para 10. 
99 PACE Res 1547 (n 72) para 78; PACE Res 1747 (n 74) para 12. 
100 PACE Res 1546 (n 87) para 5.  
101 ibid.  
102 PACE Res 1546 (n 87) para 13.6; Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice in the 
Field of Political Parties’ (n 9) para 17; PACE Res 1705 (n 93) para 13. The Venice 
Commission has found that when it comes to national legislation, the practice among states 
varies much as regards whether political parties are required to be internally democratic, 
see Venice Commission, ‘Report on the Establishment, Organisation and Activities’ (n 1) 
para 47.   
103 PACE Res 1705 (n 93) para 7.  
104 ibid para 8.  
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however, the representative model of democracy is regarded as essential by 
PACE.105 This also means that elections should include the ‘maximum 
number of opinions’.106 This has several consequences. Firstly, the threshold 
in elections should not be too high.107 Secondly, political participation is of 
outmost importance.108 ‘Equal participation of women in decision-making’ 
is considered a sign of a well-functioning democracy.109 Elections must be 
non-discriminatory, and should allow lawfully resident immigrants to vote 
at least at local and regional levels.110 This is also connected to the view of 
the Council of Europe on the relationship between democracy and culture. 
 
2.4.3 Culture and Religion: Enriching and 
Challenging Democracy 
In the view of PACE, the coexistence of the diverse cultures and religions in 
Europe has ‘considerably enriched the European heritage’.111 According to 
the preamble of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities112, the protection of national minorities is crucial for democracy, 
especially in light of Europe’s history.  
 
As concerns culture, it has been described as a crucial factor for the 
effective implementation of the core values of the Council of Europe, 
namely, human rights, democracy and the rule of law.113 A genuine 
democracy should thus not only respect cultural identities of minorities, but 
also promote the expressions, maintenance and development of those 
                                                
105 PACE Res 1547 (n 72) para 55; PACE Res 1705 (93) para 4; PACE Res 1747 (n 74) 
para 7. 
106 PACE Res 1547 (n 72) para 58; PACE Res 1705 (n 93) para 10. 
107 3 % should be the maximum, according to PACE. PACE Res 1547 (n 72) para 58. 
108 PACE Res 1546 (n 87) para 10. 
109 ‘Warsaw Summit Action Plan’ Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 
Council of Europe (Warsaw 16-17 May 2005) (17 May 2005) CM(2005)80 final, para I.3; 
PACE Res 1547 (n 72) para 57. 
110 PACE Rec 1500 (26 January 2001) para 4; PACE Res 1459 (24 June 2005) paras 3, 
11.d; PACE Rec 1791 (n 77) para 6; PACE Res 1705 (n 93) para 12. See also Committee of 
Ministers, ‘Participation of Immigrants and Foreign Residents in Political Life in the 
Council of Europe Member States: Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1500 (2001)’ 
(18 September 2002) Dec 808/10.5; Committee of Ministers, ‘”The State of Democracy in 
Europe – Specific Challenges Facing European Democracies: the Case of Diversity and 
Migration” – Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1839 (2008); and “The State of 
Democracy in Europe – Measures to Improve the Democratic Participation of Migrants”: 
Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1840 (2008)’ (20 May 2009, CM/AS(2009)-
Rec1839-1840 final) para 5. 
111 PACE Rec 1396 (27 January 1999) para 2.  
112 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (adopted 1 February 
1995, entered into force 1 February 1998) ETS 157 (Minorities Convention). 
113 ‘Warsaw Summit Action Plan’ (n 109) III. See also ‘Declaration on Intercultural 
Dialogue and Conflict Prevention’ Conference of European Ministers Responsible for 
Cultural Affairs (Opatija 20-22 October 2003) (22 October 2003) CM(2004)18) 21 January 
2004 Appendix I (‘Opatija Declaration’) preambular para 2; Committee of Ministers, ‘The 
State of Democracy in Europe’ (n 110) para 2. 
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identities.114 At the same time, there is a tension between democracy and 
culture. Cultural diversity as a fact is seen as unavoidable in democratic 
societies today, largely because of migration, but also as a ‘challenge’ for 
European democracies.115 To overcome those challenges, equal political 
participation has to be ensured.116 This means that a balance must be struck 
between ‘respect for cultural diversity and the need for integration’.117 
 
‘Cultural diversity’ has been defined as ‘the co-existence and exchange of 
culturally different practices and in the provision and consumption of 
culturally different services and products’.118 The concept has two parts: an 
intra-state dimension and an inter-state dimension.119 Cultural diversity is a 
question of fact, as opposed to ‘multiculturalism’, which is a policy 
question.120 ‘Intercultural dialogue’ is closely connected to cultural diversity 
and covers inter alia the ‘tools used to promote and protect the concept of 
cultural democracy’.121 It has been defined as: 
 
[A]n open and respectful exchange of view between individuals, 
groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic 
backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and 
respect.122 
 
Dialogue in itself is at the core of the concept of democracy.123 Intercultural 
dialogue also supports human rights, democracy and the rule of law, 124 and 
falls under the principles expressed under Articles 9-11 and 14 ECHR.125 
Democracy and intercultural dialogue has been considered as connected 
since they both demand values like for instance open-mindedness and 
tolerance.126 Furthermore, intercultural dialogue contributes to democratic 
stability, to the combat against intolerance and to prevention of conflicts.127 
To work properly, such dialogue must include all aspects of culture, both 
those that are ‘cultural in the strict sense’ and those that have ‘political, 
economic, social, philosophical or religious’ elements.128 Additionally, 
intercultural dialogue also requires respect for human rights, the rule of law 
                                                
114 Minorities Convention (n 112) preambular para 7. 
115 PACE Res 1617 (25 June 2008) paras 2, 4-5. 
116 ibid paras 8, 10. 
117 ibid para 12. 
118 ‘Opatija Declaration’ (n 113) para 9. See also Committee of Ministers, ‘Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity’ (7 December 2000) Decl-07.12.2000E, para 1.1. 
119 ‘Opatija Declaration’ (n 113) 9.  
120 Council of Europe, White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue “Living Together as Equals 
in Dignity (Council of Europe 2010) <http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white-
%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf> accessed 27 May 2014 11. 
121 ‘Opatija Declaration’ (n 113) para 9. 
122 Council of Europe (n 120) 10. 
123 ibid 20. 
124 ibid 8, 17, 37.  
125 ‘Opatija Declaration’ (n 113) para 10. 
126 Council of Europe (n 120) 17.  
127 ibid 17; ‘Opatija Declaration’ (n 113) 7. 
128 ‘Opatija Declaration’ (n 113) para 9. 
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and democracy.129 Intercultural dialogue should take place everywhere in 
society and all levels of governance.130  
 
Religion is thus one part of intercultural dialogue and cultural diversity; in a 
broad sense, religion is also part of the concept of culture. It is therefore 
quite logical that as with culture in general, PACE considers there to be a 
tension between democracy and religion.131 Religion must thus be 
‘reconciled’ with, and respect, democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law.132 But freedom of religion also flows from human dignity and its 
realisation is inextricably connected to that of democracy.133 Democracy is 
the best framework for freedom of religion and all it entails. Likewise, 
religion with its morals, ethics, values, critical approaches and cultural 
expressions can be ‘a valid partner of democratic society’.134 In the context 
of intercultural dialogue and particularly the religious aspect of it, PACE 
has pointed out that freedom of religion is part of the basis of a ‘democratic 
society’ within the meaning of ECHR.135  
 
PACE has suggested that the ‘secular character of the state’ should be one 
democratic standard.136 This would mean that the State should be neutral to 
all forms of belief, including agnostics, and would not prevent the State 
from having a national culture containing elements taken from religions.137 
There is a risk that religion is turned into extremism. However, PACE 
distinguishes extremism from religion, as a ‘distortion or perversion of 
it’.138 It is a ‘human invention that diverts religion from its humanist path to 
make it an instrument of power’.139 Intolerant and prejudiced extremism that 
may advocate violence is a ‘symptom of a sick society’ and threatens 
democracy.140 
 
2.4.4 Extremism and Intolerance: Threats to 
Democracy 
PACE has also addressed extremism at a more general level.141 The 
Assembly has defined extremism as  
                                                
129 Council of Europe (n 120) 19, 20. 
130 Council of Europe (n 120) 10, 37. 
131 PACE Rec 1396 (n 111) para 3. 
132 PACE Rec 1202 (2 February 1993) para 9; PACE Rec 1396 (n 111) para 4. 
133 PACE Rec 1202 (n 132) para 14, Council of Europe (n 120) 22.  
134 PACE Rec 1396 (n 111) para 5. The Committee of Ministers held that religious 
pluralism is more than this; it is ‘an inherent feature of the notion of a democratic society’. 
Committee of Ministers, ‘Religion and Democracy’ (19 September 2001) Dec 765/4.1. 
135 PACE Rec 1962 (12 April 2011) para 3.  
136 PACE Res 1407 (n 24) para 9.8. 
137 PACE Res 1407 (n 24) para 9.8. PACE has also emphasized that ‘the principle of state 
neutrality applies to religious education at school’, see PACE Res 1962 (n 135) para 14.  
138 PACE Rec 1396 (n 111) para 3.  
139 ibid.  
140 ibid para 9.  
141 See also Committee of Ministers, ‘Declaration Regarding Intolerance – A Threat to 
Democracy’ (adopted 14 May 1981) Decl-14.0581E. 
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‘[A] form of political activity that overtly or covertly rejects the 
principles of parliamentary democracy, and very often bases its 
ideology and its political practices and conduct on intolerance, 
exclusion, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and ultra-nationalism’.142  
 
Racism, hatred and intolerance contribute to undermining the trust in 
‘authorities, the rule of law and ultimately democracy’.143 Thus, extremist 
parties advocating values contrary to democracy and human rights are 
considered a threat to the ‘fundamental values’ of the Council of Europe.144 
In fact, PACE held in 2000 that the largest threat to democracy was right-
wing extremist movements and parties that furthered intolerance, 
xenophobia and racism.145 Even without directly encouraging violence, they 
were considered to create a ‘climate that encourages its development’.146 
Such hostile climate may have an overt or covert connection with racist 
violence or ‘organised racism’.147  
 
Extremism thus poses a direct threat to democracy by endangering the 
constitutional order and freedoms.148 However, it also poses an indirect 
threat by risking to ‘distort political life’, as ‘traditional political parties’ 
may try to combat extremist parties by adopting their ideas.149 It may also 
be noted that extremist parties often do not apply internal democracy.150 
 
In 2010, PACE again expressed its concern at the increase of extremism in 
Europe, which used the rights and freedoms of democracies to further aims 
incompatible with democratic and human rights values and even encouraged 
violence.151 The Assembly particularly mentioned racism, xenophobia, 
Islamic fundamentalism and groups like PKK and ETA as preoccupying 
forms of extremism.152 This corresponds more or less to the reasons often 
used by States when dissolving parties,153 and some cases have reached the 
ECtHR. In those cases, the ECtHR has consistently pronounced on the 
characteristics of democracy in general. This will be the subject of the next 
subsection. 
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2.5 European Court of Human Rights: 
Democracy and Human Rights  
2.5.1 General Considerations 
The ECtHR has held that the ‘underlying values’ of the ECHR to uphold 
and further democracy154 are part of the ‘common heritage’155 mentioned in 
the preamble to the ECHR.156 Taking into account that the rights and 
freedoms in Articles 8-11 ECHR may only be limited insofar as it is 
‘necessary in a democratic society’, the ECtHR concludes that democracy 
seems to be the ‘only political model contemplated’ by, and thus compatible 
with, the ECHR.157 Democracy is, according to the ECtHR, undoubtedly ‘a 
fundamental feature of the European public order’;158 the Convention was 
made to ‘promote and maintain the ideals and values of a democratic 
society’.159 
 
Some of the provisions of ECHR have been singled out as characteristic to 
democracy;160 Articles 9-11 ECHR have been described as ‘democratic 
rights’161 that are interdependent.162 Freedom of expression is not only 
essential for democracy, but also ‘one of the basic conditions for its progress 
and each individual’s self-fulfilment’.163 As pluralism is crucial for 
democracy, freedom of expression applies ‘not only to “information” or 
“ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter 
of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb’.164 Political 
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parties may seek protection under Articles 10-11 ECHR as their activities 
constitute a ‘collective exercise of freedom of expression’.165 The right to 
free elections in Article 3 Protocol 1 ECHR has also been considered as 
crucial for democracy.166  
 
The ECtHR has also held that the values of pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness are ‘hallmarks of a “democratic society”’. This means that 
democracy is not only endorsing the views of the majority but rather must 
obtain a balance between individual and collective interests so that 
minorities are fairly treated and the majority does not abuse its power.167 
Consequently, in a democracy governments may be more widely criticised 
than private individuals or politicians, and thorough scrutiny of it is 
necessary.168  
 
2.5.2 Political Parties: Ensuring Pluralism 
The ECtHR has also several times held that political parties enjoying the 
right and freedoms in Articles 10-11 ECHR play a ‘primordial role’ in a 
democracy.169 Political parties are ‘essential to the proper functioning of 
democracy’.170 Political debate, including on political programmes that 
challenge the prevailing organization of the State, is essential to democracy 
(as long as they do not impair democracy itself).171 The State is the ‘ultimate 
guarantor’ of the principle of a pluralist democracy.172 It also means that the 
State must organize regular free elections so that the people may express its 
opinions, which would be impossible without a plurality of political 
parties.173 However, the State has a wide margin of appreciation to choose a 
suitable electoral system.174 
 
It should be noted that the concept of ‘pluralism’ is an ambivalent one; it is 
used differently in different disciplines and it may refer both to individuals 
and groups.175 Political parties and freedom of association is only one of the 
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fundamental rights that are directly connected with pluralism.176 
Furthermore, pluralism has an important role in the political process outside 
of the context of political parties. Individuals seek to influence politics also 
through other kinds of associations, which also contributes a pluralist 
democracy and social cohesion.177 Political pluralism should not be 
distinguished from pluralism in society, and it could be argued that the 
ECtHR probably views the latter as a prerequisite for political pluralism.178 
Nieuwenhuis concludes that pluralism, in the view of the ECtHR, is a 
‘diversity of values, opinions, and social groups and the absence of 
predominance of particular values, opinions or groups’.179 This seems to be 
supported by what the ECtHR has said about pluralism in general.180  
 
It appears from the above that Articles 10 and 11 are often mentioned 
together. Indeed, they are so closely connected that Article 11 is to be 
‘considered in the light of Article 10’.181 The reason is that the freedom of 
expression in Article 10 is also one of the aims of Article 11.182 According 
to the ECtHR, this is especially important in the case of political parties, as 
they are vital for pluralism and democracy.183 
 
‘Pluralism’ includes for the ECtHR respecting cultural diversity in order to 
enhance social cohesion.184 The conception of democracy of the ECtHR has 
thus been described as a ‘rather thick, inclusive’ one, being attentive to the 
participation of minorities.185 In the next section, the relationship between 
democracy, culture and religion in the view of the ECtHR is examined a 
little more closely. 
 
2.5.3 Religion, Pluralism and Secularism 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion under Article 9 ECHR is 
considered as ‘one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the 
meaning of the Convention’.186 The freedom of religion specifically is 
                                                
176 ibid 370-373. 
177 ibid 378. 
178 ibid 383. 
179 ibid 384. 
180 See text to n 167-168. 
181 United Communist Party (n 54) para 42; Socialist Party (n 164) para 41; ÖZDEP (n 
164) para 37; Yazar (n 156) para 46; DEP (n 157) para 43; STP (n 164) para 36; CDPP (n 
168) para 62; Batasuna (n 164) para 74; HADEP and Demir (n 164) para 56. 
182 United Communist Party (n 54) para 42; Socialist Party (n 164) para 41; ÖZDEP (n 
164) para 37; Yazar (n 156) para 46; DEP (n 157) para 43; Refah Partisi (n 156) para 88; 
STP (n 164) para 36; CDPP (n 168) para 62; Batasuna (n 164) para 74; HADEP and Demir 
(n 164) para 5. 
183 United Communist Party (n 54) para 43; Socialist Party (n 164) para 41; ÖZDEP (n 
164) para 37; Yazar (n 156) para 46; DEP (n 157) para 43; Refah Partisi (n 156) para 88; 
STP (n 164) para 36; CDPP (n 168) para 62; Batasuna (n 164) para 74; HADEP and Demir 
(n 164) para 56. 
184 Ten Napel (n 67) 467.  
185 ibid. 
186 Refah Partisi (n 156) para 90. 
 26 
fundamental for believers, but it is also ‘a precious asset for atheists, 
agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned’, as it has both a positive and a 
negative aspect.187 The ECtHR held that ‘the pluralism indissociable from a 
democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends 
on [the freedom of religion]’.188  
 
In diverse democracies, it may be necessary to restrict the freedom of 
religion to ‘reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that 
everyone’s beliefs are respected’.189 The State here has the role of the 
‘neutral and impartial organizer’, and thereby contributes to ‘public order, 
religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society’.190 Thus, a State 
may require civil servants not to take part in the ‘Islamic fundamentalist 
movement, whose goal and plan of action is to bring about the pre-eminence 
of religious rules’.191 The State may also legitimately hinder fundamentalist 
religious movements from pressuring university students.192 This could 
mean for instance limiting the place and fashion in which persons in 
universities may manifest their religion, in order to ensure ‘peaceful 
coexistence between students’ and thereby securing ‘public order and the 
beliefs of others’.193 
 
In the Refah Partisi case, which concerned a religious party aiming to 
introduce sharia law and a plurality of legal systems, the ECtHR held that 
the principle of secularism is compatible with the rule of law and respect for 
human rights and democracy.194 Furthermore, not respecting that principle 
may result in loss of protection under Article 9.195 Kocak and Örücü argue 
that the Turkish Constitutional Court may have affected the ECtHR in 
finding that the dissolution met a pressing social need, and that the case 
shows that secularism has an important role in democracy.196 Secularism is 
considered a sine qua non of democracy by the Turkish government.197 The 
authors also point out, however, that a possibility is that the ECtHR took 
this opportunity to ‘warn’ future Islamic parties to attempt to establish 
sharia and use religion as a political means.198 
 
The ECtHR has been criticised for its reasoning. The principle of secularism 
is arguably difficult to define. 199 The parties in the Refah case seem to agree 
that the principle of secularism is necessary for Turkish democracy, but to 
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disagree as to the content of that principle.200 Under those circumstances, it 
could be questioned that the ECtHR still drew the drastic conclusion that not 
respecting secularism might lead to loss of protection under Article 9 
ECHR.201 Furthermore, it could be argued that the disagreement as to the 
content of secularism is precisely such an issue that should be discussed and 
resolved within the framework provided by democracy.202 Otherwise it 
could not be said that democracy and pluralism is inextricably connected.203  
Critics have also asked whether it is for a human rights court to require 
adherence to secularism. Although the Refah judgment could be interpreted 
as an attempt to reconcile human rights, democracy and secularism, many 
European States are in fact not secular.204 The standard in the Refah case 
seems arguably different from the one applied in, for instance, cases 
protecting Catholic States’ legislation prohibiting abortion.205 If secularism 
is seen rather as an ideology, it could be argued that human rights should not 
require it; international human rights standards do not do so.206  
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
Considering the many models of democracy, it is perhaps not surprising that 
no general definition has been agreed upon in international law. Although 
gaining in influence, the idea of for instance a right to democratic 
governance remains a controversial issue. The Council of Europe, on the 
contrary, seems to over the years have developed a common view on the 
concept of democracy. The Member States still have for instance different 
electoral systems, but there appears to be some agreement on the 
fundamental principles of democracy. Likewise, the ‘political’ institutions 
and the ECtHR in many ways appear to share the conception of democracy. 
Thus, it is clear that democracy is the only political system compatible with 
the Council of Europe, as well as that democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law are practically inseparable. It is also clear that the type of democracy 
considered is characterized by a tolerant pluralism that includes all kinds of 
ideas in its sphere. However, much focus remains on free and fair elections, 
which are still absolutely crucial for a contemporary democracy built around 
the electoral systems. As a consequence, political parties also play a vital 
role for democracy. But not only do they have to exist; in order for a 
democracy to be well functioning they also must enjoy certain rights and 
freedoms, such as freedom of expression and association. These rights and 
freedoms contribute to a pluralist political system where as many opinions 
as possible are allowed. It  could thus be argued that the Council of Europe 
has settled for a democratic model which goes well beyond a procedural 
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one, although still strongly emphasizing the procedural core of democracy – 
elections.  
 
Culture, including religion, is an example of an area where the boundaries 
of democracy are less clear. Culture is considered both as an asset and as a 
challenge to democracy. Threats to democracy may be related to religious 
fundamentalism, and could be seen as ‘internal’ when coming from political 
parties. Other threats may be external, such as an economic crisis. In either 
case, Bligh seems to be right that the threats to democracy have indeed 
changed from challenging democracy as whole to focusing on certain 
elements of democracy. Facing democratic challenges, dissolution of parties 
is one measure that States can use to protect democracy. The next section 
concerns how that measure is perceived by the Council of Europe 
institutions. 
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3 Restrictions on Political 
Parties within the Council of 
Europe 
3.1 Introduction 
Fox and Nolte hold that State practice points to the conclusion that most 
democracies have a possibility to in some way prohibit parties.207 At a 
general level, there is a loose consensus on that democracies may undertake 
some kind of measures to protect themselves.208 Among Council of Europe 
States, however, the practice varies considerably from country to country; 
measures vary from material restrictions to the dissolution of political 
parties.209 Examples of material restrictions on parties include legal 
sanctions against parties with certain aims of behaviours.210 The most 
common reasons for dissolution of parties are that they have unlawful or 
immoral aims, that they pose a threat to fundamental freedoms, extremist 
characteristics, encouraging of discrimination, hatred or violence, or that 
they threaten the existence of the State.211 Most European States require that 
a political party pursue both unlawful means and objectives in order for it to 
be prohibited.212 
 
However, the Venice Commission has found that in countries where parties 
had been dissolved relatively recently, they were generally small extremist 
groups.213 As the number of cases where parties had been dissolved was so 
low, the Commission concluded that States consider freedom of association 
and the principle of proportionality to be of outmost importance.214 This 
also indicated that this severe measure was only used in exceptional 
cases.215 Furthermore, restrictions on political parties were not present in all 
of the States surveyed, which led the Commission to conclude that such 
measures were not fundamental for a well-functioning democracy.216 
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Extremism is viewed as a serious threat to democracy by for instance 
PACE.217 The Assembly has also acknowledged the dilemma that comes 
with extremism; democracy must ensure political groups the fundamental 
freedoms of expression, assembly and association but also be able to protect 
itself against extremist groups contrary to democracy and human rights.218 
 
PACE considered that the Member States should use the ECHR, the United 
Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD)219 and the general policy recommendations of the 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) as guidelines 
when fighting extremism.220 According to ECRI’s General Policy 
Recommendation No 7, States’ national law should contain a possibility of 
dissolving associations, including political parties, promoting racism.221 
 
Thus, the Assembly has invited the Member States to limit the freedom of 
expression, assembly and association in order to combat extremism.222 It 
also encouraged them to, in extreme cases, make it possible to legally 
dissolve extremist parties and movements when the constitutional order of 
the State is threatened.223 The Member States should then also ‘monitor, and 
if necessary prevent the reconstitution of the dissolved parties or movements 
under another form or name’.224  
 
Dissolution of political parties is an exceptional measure. Other means to 
fight extremism could be more or less intrusive. Punishing members of 
political parties who incite to violence or intolerance or denial of public 
funding are examples of more serious measures. Encouraging awareness 
rising on extremism or using school curricula to educate on extremism are 
other possibilities.225 Arguably, the dissolution of a political party is the 
most severe measure available for the State. Democracy is really brought to 
a head in these cases, and that is also why dissolution of parties is the sole 
focus of this thesis. This chapter will examine how the Council of Europe 
institutions perceive of that phenomenon.  
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3.2 Conditions for the Dissolution of 
Political Parties 
Both PACE and the Venice Commission have pronounced on which 
circumstances could justify the dissolution of a political party. According to 
the Assembly, the dissolution of a political party may be legitimate under 
exceptional circumstances when the party threatens democracy.226 The 
Venice Commission also considers it to be a very intrusive measure, that 
should be used with particular restriction.227 Less intrusive measures should 
primarily be used; dissolution should only be considered as a last resort.228 
The dissolution decision should be taken by an appropriate judicial organ 
which ensures compliance with constitutional and international standards, 
due process, openness and a fair trial.229 Furthermore, PACE held that 
prevention of abuse by political authorities should be provided for by 
specific rules set out in legislation.230 The great risk of abuse in this context 
has also been pointed out by for instance Fox and Nolte; it is difficult to 
assess whether a certain party actually poses a threat to democracy.231 The 
risk of abuse is even greater since what is at stake is really a norm about 
politics.232 
 
According to PACE, political parties should only be dissolved if they are 
violent or if they are threatening ‘civil peace and the democratic 
constitutional order’.233 The Venice Commission, however, held that 
dissolution of a political parties may only be applied in relation to parties 
that encourage violence or that ‘use violence as a political means to 
overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby undermining the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution’.234 It is not sufficient, 
according to the Commission, that a party peacefully strives for a change in 
the Constitution in order for it to be dissolved.235 As we shall see, this view 
is stricter than the one adopted by the ECtHR.236 The Venice Commission 
has acknowledged this difference itself, holding that its view however 
‘conforms to what has been the actual practice in democratic Europe for 
many decades’.237 
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Both PACE and the Venice Commission have held that the activities of the 
party’s members must be distinguished from those of the party. In the view 
of the Assembly, activities by the members are not attributable to the party 
if they are incompatible with the statute or activities of the party.238 The 
Venice Commission instead focused on whether the party had authorised the 
activities or not.239 
 
Consequently, the Venice Commission has concluded that there is a 
European consensus that political parties should only be dissolved in the 
most extreme cases.240 It could thus be said that the European answer to the 
classic democratic dilemma, is that threats to democracy should be met by 
‘open debate’ and through ‘democratic channels’.241 
 
Generally, States have conferred on the judiciary to be responsible for the 
dissolution of political parties. 242 In most countries, however, prosecution 
did not have the exclusive competence to initiate dissolution proceedings.243 
The argument for this was that this type of cases is of political nature, and 
that a dissolution process may adversely affect the political situation.244 
Thus, legal criteria were not enough for dissolution, but rather should also 
the risk to democracy and the political consequences of a dissolution be 
considered.245 Among the European countries, Turkey was perhaps the only 
one which allowed a public prosecutor to start a dissolution process ‘without 
any kind of political and democratic check and balance’.246 In either case, 
political parties that have been dissolved can turn to the ECtHR as a last 
resort. Before looking in detail at the dissolution cases from the ECtHR in 
chapter 4, the next section examines how the attitude of the ECtHR towards 
party dissolution at a general level. 
 
3.3 European Court of Human Rights: 
General Limits for the Dissolution of 
Political Parties  
The ECtHR has clearly stated that freedom of association under Article 11 
ECHR is applicable in party dissolution cases,247 and this provision has been 
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the primary focus of the ECtHR. Furthermore, there has been little dispute 
regarding the fact that the dissolution of political parties constitutes an 
interference with the freedom of association.248 In most cases, the question 
of whether the interference was prescribed by law does not give rise to any 
doubts either.249 Moreover, the dissolution of a political party is mostly 
found by the ECtHR to pursue the legitimate aims of protecting national 
security250 and public safety, prevention of disorder or crime and protection 
of the rights and freedom of others.251 The core issue in party dissolution 
cases is thus whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society 
in accordance with Article 11(2) ECHR.252 
 
In order to reach a compromise between individual rights and the protection 
of democracy, measures taken by national authorities must thus comply with 
Article 11(2) ECHR.253 Petman observes that the ECtHR here acknowledges 
that popular sovereignty and individual rights may clash with each other.254 
The role of the ECtHR as the protector of democracy is therefore 
ambiguous. It must sometimes choose the protection of superior ‘European’ 
values over that of the people’s will or the values of tolerance, pluralism and 
broadmindedness.255 Furthermore, the wording in Article 11(2), ‘necessary 
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in a democratic society’ forces the ECtHR to choose one of all conceptions 
of democracy as a standard.256 Petman holds that the ECtHR thus takes part 
in the debate in society over the understanding of democracy, and in doing 
so it is inevitably a political actor.257 Lorange Backer notes that in the light 
of the aim of the Council of Europe to promote democracy, ‘it is a paradox 
that important value judgments are made and issues affecting democratic 
government are decided’ by the ECtHR, which has limited democratic 
legitimacy.258 
 
The ECtHR has noted that European history shows that totalitarian political 
parties may well use a democratic regime to grow and then revoke it.259  
Articles 9-11 ECHR cannot, then, imply that a State does not have the right 
to protect its institutions when they are threatened.260  Also, considering the 
close relationship between ECHR and democracy, the provisions therein 
must not be used to ‘weaken or destroy the ideals and values of a 
democratic society’.261  
 
The State may thus have to take measures to protect the ‘stability and 
effectiveness of a democratic system’.262 The question is then what the 
limits to those measures are. Because of the important role of political 
parties to democracy, Article 11(2) is to be applied in a strict manner.263 The 
freedom of association in cases concerning political parties may only be 
limited by ‘convincing and compelling reasons’.264 Moreover, the Member 
States have ‘a limited margin of appreciation, which goes hand in hand with 
rigorous European supervision embracing both the law and the decisions 
applying it, including those given by independent courts’.265 Only in the 
‘most serious cases’ may such intrusive measures as the dissolution of an 
entire political party of the temporary banning of its leaders from political 
life be used.266 
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However, the ECtHR has emphasized that it does not replace the view of the 
national authorities with its own.267 At the same time, its supervision does 
not only consist of assessing whether the State has exercised its margin of 
appreciation ‘reasonably, carefully and in good faith’.268 Rather, the ECtHR 
reviews under Article 11 the decisions of those authorities, assessing 
whether they have ‘based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the 
relevant facts’,269 in order to determine whether the interference was 
‘proportionate to the aims pursued’.270 In practice, the ECtHR conducts this 
review by using the grounds for the dissolution put forward by the national 
authorities as a basis for its assessment. The ECtHR then assesses each 
ground separately.271 
 
The ECtHR has also defined the limits slightly more concretely. In order for 
an interference with the applicant’s freedom of association to be necessary 
in a democratic society, it must meet a ‘pressing social need’.272 A 
fundamental characteristic of democracy is the peaceful resolution of issues 
even when they are ‘irksome’; ‘democracy thrives on freedom of 
expression’.273 Therefore, a political party cannot be dissolved only because 
it engages in political debate.274 Drawing on this, the ECtHR considers that 
a political party may advocate for legal and constitutional changes on two 
conditions: ‘firstly, the means used to that end must in every respect be legal 
and democratic, and secondly, the change proposed must itself be 
compatible with fundamental democratic principles’.275 This means that if a 
party and its leaders incite to violence or have a policy that is incompatible 
with democracy, they cannot claim the rights and freedoms of the ECHR to 
protect them from penalties consequently imposed on them.276 
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Judges Ress and Rozakis wished to clarify and limit the two conditions just 
mentioned in the case of Refah Partisi. They emphasized that they cannot be 
taken to mean that the ECHR only protects political parties who fully 
follows the law.277 They further pointed out that: 
 
It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of the rules of democracy, apart 
from the basic ones. It is without doubt correct to say that parties that 
aim at the destruction of democracy cannot enjoy protection against 
even such drastic measures as dissolution. But whether the failure to 
respect this or that rule of democracy justifies dissolution or whether a 
less drastic measure is the only appropriate and adequate one is again 
a question that has to be judged with regard to the principle of 
proportionality.278 
 
In the Refah case, the ECtHR focused on three issues in order to assess 
whether the interference with the applicants’ freedom of association met a 
pressing social need: 
1. Whether there was plausible evidence of a sufficiently imminent risk 
to democracy.279 This concerns the timing of the dissolution. 
2. Whether the acts and expressions made by the members of the party 
could be attributed to the party.280 
3. Whether such acts and expressions taken together formed a ‘clear 
picture of a model of society conceived and advocated by the party 
which was incompatible with the concept of a “democratic 
society”’.281  
The structure of the next chapter roughly follows this scheme, with the 
exception of the third point being divided into two parts. This point appears 
to encompass the two conditions mentioned above, set out by the ECtHR in 
its previous case-law.282 
 
Finally, the case of Vona v Hungary, which did not concern a political party 
but an organisation, contains an interesting concurring opinion by judge 
Pinto de Albuquerque. The judge referred to Article 4 of ICERD, which 
prescribes that States Parties prohibit associations inciting racial 
discrimination.283 He also pointed out that the Rome Statute to the 
International Criminal Court284 considers persecution against a group on for 
instance ethnic, political or religious grounds as a crime against 
humanity.285 Both the EU and Council of Europe had taken measures to 
combat racism, discrimination and xenophobia; ECRI had explicitly held 
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that banning racist associations was part of that.286 Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque concluded that States have a duty to dissolve groups, 
organisations, associations and parties that promote racism, xenophobia or 
ethnic intolerance.287 They also must criminalize the dissemination of such 
ideas.288 In this context, they have a positive obligation to hinder private 
actors from committing such offences.289 Such an obligation was, in the 
view of the judge, a peremptory norm of customary international law.290 
Thus, it would be a breach of a State’s international obligations to tolerate 
for instance political parties which aim to disseminate racism, xenophobia 
or ethnic intolerance.291 Kocak and Örücü appears to agree on this issue, 
arguing that democracy is more than just a system of majoritarian rule and 
that it not only has to be able to, but that it has a duty to protect itself.292 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
PACE and ECRI have held that States should, if they do not already have it, 
introduce the possibility of dissolving political parties in exceptional cases. 
Despite this, State practice varies and dissolution is a rarely used measure. 
In any case, the institutions of the Council of Europe clearly all 
acknowledge that it may be legitimate to dissolve a political party under 
exceptional circumstances. They also appear to be in agreement about the 
principles that should govern the dissolution process. As a dissolution is a 
particularly severe measure, it has to be applied restrictively in the most 
extreme cases, and as a last resort. The State therefore has a limited margin 
of appreciation in this respect.  
 
It is also clear that actions and statements of party members are not 
automatically considered as representing also the party. In the next section 
the view of the ECtHR will be examined more in detail. Furthermore, both 
PACE and the Venice Commission have emphasized that the judiciary has 
an important role to play in those cases. However, only the Commission 
appears to consider that also political considerations should be taken into 
account before starting a judicial process. PACE and ECtHR both seem to 
have been silent on the issue. Likewise, the institutions seemingly disagree 
as to what should be required for a dissolution, particularly when it comes to 
the weight afforded to the party’s attitude to violence. The Venice 
Commission has itself admitted that its standard is stricter than the one set 
out by the ECtHR. 
 
From a legal perspective, Article 11 ECHR is the provision that is 
applicable to party dissolution cases. In order for a dissolution measure to be 
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‘necessary in a democratic society’ it must correspond to a pressing social 
need. The ECtHR has developed quite a detailed test in order to assess 
whether such a need existed or not. In the next chapter, we will see how it 
has applied this test more concretely. 
 
Lastly, some argue that it should in fact be a duty on the part of the State to 
dissolve parties that promote racism, xenophobia and intolerance. PACE, 
ECRI and judge Pinto de Albuquerque have argued so in the light of 
international law. Perhaps the ECtHR will in the future have to deal with 
allegations that a State violated the ECHR because it has not dissolved a 
party that for instance aimed for the destruction of the rights of others 
through discrimination. The next chapter, however, will examine the 
existing jurisprudence more closely. 
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4 Cases on the Dissolution of 
Political Parties in the 
European Court of Human 
Rights 
4.1 Introduction 
This section will examine what view the ECtHR has taken towards the 
dissolution of political parties. Twelve of the fifteen dissolution cases 
referred to below originate in Turkey. The Refah Partisi case is the only 
Turkish case where the ECtHR has found a dissolution to be compatible 
with the ECHR. The other eleven Turkish cases concern parties that in quite 
similar ways advocated for the rights and self-determination of the Kurdish 
people. The one case from Bulgaria examined below is quite similar to the 
Turkish cases, also concerning a party allegedly with separatist aims 
threatening the territorial integrity of the country. Besides the Refah Partisi 
case, the only case where the ECtHR has found a party dissolution to be 
legal is in the Batasuna case, which originates in Spain.293 The case 
concerned a separatist party with close connections to ETA.  
 
The core issue in party dissolution cases is whether the interference with 
freedom of association was necessary in a democratic society in accordance 
with Article 11(2) ECHR. As appears in chapter 3, the main part of the 
assessment of necessity concerns whether this measure met a pressing social 
need.294 In the context of the dissolution of political parties, I have identified 
four elements that the ECtHR make use of to assess this question.  
 
The ECtHR does not continue to examine violations of other Articles of the 
ECHR where it has found a violation of Article 11.295 In two old cases, 
however, the EComHR has touched upon Article 17 ECHR,296 which 
prohibits the abuse of the ECHR. Although this thesis is confined to the 
dissolution itself of a political party, Article 17 ECHR is still relevant here. 
A party that falls under Article 17 does not enjoy the protection of the 
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ECHR, which in principle means that the dissolution is justified (at least 
under this instrument).  
 
4.2 Pressing Social Need 
4.2.1 Timing of the Dissolution: Established 
and Sufficient Risk to Democracy 
A State does not have to wait for a political party to come to power and 
actually starting to implement its policy before it takes measures, provided 
that there is a ‘sufficiently established and imminent’ danger to 
democracy.297 Where domestic courts have found such a danger to exist, the 
State may ‘reasonably forestall’ interference with a policy incompatible 
with the ECHR and democracy before the party tries to realize it.298 The 
ECtHR argued that this view is consistent with Article 1 ECHR, according 
to which the States have a duty to ensure that all persons within their 
jurisdiction enjoy the rights and freedoms set out in the ECHR.299 
 
In the Refah Partisi case, the party in question had been dissolved for not 
adhering to the principle of secularism enshrined in the Turkish constitution. 
The ECtHR examined whether the timing of the dissolution was 
appropriate, i.e. whether Refah posed a threat to democracy at the time of its 
dissolution.300 During the time from its formation in 1983 until the mid-90s, 
Refah gained considerable support.301 Thus, in the 1995 general election 
Refah became the largest political party in the country, and a year later it 
formed a coalition government with another party.302 Keeping this in mind, 
the ECtHR held that at this time, the party had ‘real potential’ to come to 
power on its own, without forming a coalition.303 In assessing this risk, the 
domestic courts were allowed to take into account also statements by the 
members of the party made several years prior to the dissolution.304 
Furthermore, the ‘real chances’ that Refah would realize its policies after 
coming to power made the danger to the rights and freedoms enshrined in 
the ECHR ‘more tangible and more immediate’.305 Therefore, the ECtHR 
considered that the Turkish courts had not acted neither too late nor too 
early; in this respect, the authorities had not trespassed their margin of 
appreciation.306 This could be taken to mean that the ECtHR supports 
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‘militant democracies’ by allowing a State to intervene before an anti-
democratic party has come to power.307  
 
Macklem argues that the notions of timing, standard of proof and 
probability of harm need to be further clarified in order to avoid abuse of the 
‘militant democracy’ concept.308 Also, the evidence standard of proof was 
too low; ‘clear and convincing evidence’ should be presented to show that 
the party would probably come to power and that democracy will 
‘necessarily and immediately’ be eliminated.309 For a party ban to be 
justifiable, the ‘acceptable and unacceptable components’ of the party 
programme should be inseparable, so that it would be impossible to 
determine that certain elements, but not the entire party, was incompatible 
with democracy.310 Furthermore, the assessment of the probability of harm 
should entail consideration of any alternative means of protecting 
democracy.311 In light of the weak evidence in the case and the fact that the 
party was not really dissolved for what it had already done but for the future 
risk it posed to democracy, Boyle concludes that the ECtHR applied a quite 
wide margin of appreciation rather than a narrow one.312 This could have 
been a sign of a multicultural attitude of the ECtHR, wanting to maintain the 
diversity in national jurisdictions.313 However, one view is that it instead 
exercised ‘cultural singularism’.314 
 
Bligh points out that the ECtHR did not assess the timing of the dissolution 
in the Batasuna case.315 Whether the party actually posed a ‘sufficiently 
established and imminent threat’ was not considered; the encouragement of 
violence and the connection to ETA appears to have been enough.316 
However, the ECtHR has in other cases held that the party in question was 
too small to realistically be having any chances to implement its ideas.317 
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4.2.2 Relationship Between the Programme of a 
Party and Activities of its Members 
The programme of a party may not always reflect the actual intentions of its 
leaders and members.318 In the past, political parties with objectives 
incompatible with democracy have not stated these goals officially until 
after they have come to power.319 The programme should therefore be 
compared with the actions and positions taken by the party and its 
leaders.320 Insofar as these, taken together, depict the party’s objectives, they 
may be taken into account when assessing the justification of the dissolution 
of a political party.321 
 
In the Refah Partisi case, the ECtHR held that the statements of the party’s 
chairman and vice-chairmen were clearly imputable to Refah as a whole.322 
If these leaders do not make clear that they are expressing their personal 
opinions, their statements are naturally taken to be made on behalf of the 
party.323 Furthermore, the actions and statements of members of parliament 
or members of the party holding local government positions were 
attributable to Refah insofar as they together constituted a reflection of the 
sort of society that the party aimed for.324 The ECtHR argued that such 
actions or statements are probable to influence the electorate, since they are 
made by persons elected for a certain party, and are thus perceived as made 
on behalf of that party.325 In the case of Refah Partisi, however, the party 
had not distanced itself from the relevant actions or statements but on the 
contrary made the responsible persons candidates for important positions 
and in one case also disseminated the speech within the party.326 The only 
disciplinary action taken by the party occurred after the institution of the 
dissolution proceedings, most likely as an attempt to avoid the 
dissolution.327 
 
In a number of cases, parties have been dissolved immediately after their 
formation, limiting the assessment of the grounds for their dissolution to 
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their constitution and programmes.328 This affects the proportionality 
assessment, as the result of such a measure is that the party is dissolved only 
for activities relating to the exercise of the freedom of expression.329 
 
Conversely, it may also be the case that the ECtHR limits itself to assessing 
the activities and statements of members of the party in question.330 In the 
Socialist Party case, the Turkish Constitutional Court had declared the 
programme of the party constitutional in a previous decision.331 However, if 
the programme of the party supports the conclusion that it is not intending to 
pursue undemocratic aims or means, the national court should take it into 
account. In HADEP and Demir, it had not been claimed that the programme 
of HADEP was unconstitutional.332 Nevertheless, the ECtHR observed that 
the programme advocated democracy, rule of law and human rights – and 
even condemned violence.333 The Constitutional Court should have 
considered this.334 
 
4.2.3 Undemocratic Aims 
4.2.3.1 ‘Separatist’ Parties 
In cases concerning parties with allegedly separatist aims, the Court has 
only found there to be an undemocratic aim in one case. In the Herri 
Batasuna case, the party was found to have the illegal ‘aim of overthrowing 
the constitutional order or seriously disturbing the public peace’.335 
However, Batasuna focuses on the party’s support for violence and 
terrorism rather than its aims. 
 
The constitution and programme of TBKP referred to one Kurdish nation 
and one Turkish nation, which according to the Turkish Constitutional Court 
‘encouraged separatism and the division of the Turkish nation’.336 The 
ECtHR noted that the programme of the party did not describe the Kurds as 
a minority nor as entitled to any ‘special treatment or rights’, nor a right to 
secession.337 Instead, the aim of the TBKP was a ‘peaceful, democratic and 
fair solution of the Kurdish problem’.338 
 
The statements of the party leader in the Socialist Party case were found to 
depict the party as striving for a federal system which was to be established 
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through democratic means.339 Although the leader had made reference to the 
‘Kurdish nation’ and the right to secession, the ECtHR did not find that the 
statements taken together did promote the secession from Turkey.340 Rather, 
they stressed the necessity of a referendum in order to ensure that the system 
was established with the free consent of the Kurds.341 The ECtHR then held: 
 
In the ECtHR’s view, the fact that such a political programme is 
considered incompatible with the current principles and structures of 
the Turkish State does not make it incompatible with the rules of 
democracy. It is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse political 
programmes to be proposed and debated, even those that call into 
question the way a State is currently organised, provided that they do 
not harm democracy itself.342 
 
Similarly, in the ÖZDEP case, the ECtHR found that the party had not 
encouraged the secession from Turkey by referring to the right to self-
determination for minorities, but rather that it attempted to stress the 
importance of a free consent of the Kurds for their proposed ‘social order 
encompassing the Turkish and Kurdish peoples’.343  
 
In Yazar, the ECtHR observed that merely promoting the principles of the 
right to self-determination and recognition of language rights, as the HEP 
did, could not in itself be contrary to democracy.344 The ECtHR argued that 
this would harm democratic debate and fuel violent tendencies, which 
would be ‘strongly at variance with the spirit of Article 11’ and its founding 
democratic principles.345 Also, the ECtHR considered it essential for ‘the 
proper functioning of democracy’ that ideas based upon those principles can 
be launched into the public debate and contribute to solutions to the nation’s 
problems.346 
 
The ECtHR has observed that analysing the situation of the Kurds in 
Turkey, advocating for the rights of Kurds in accordance with international 
instruments, promoting the cessation of oppression of Kurds, criticising the 
government’s methods of fighting separatist, or analysing the development 
of the working class in Turkey and elsewhere, were not in itself contrary to 
fundamental democratic principles.347 Furthermore, the programme of the 
parties did not at all encourage violence as a means of political change.348 
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In the UMO Ilinden – PIRIN case, the ECtHR held that nothing suggested 
that the party had undemocratic aims.349 It has been dissolved because of 
‘separatist ideas’,350 as shown by inter alia statements, letters and maps 
where members had held that there was a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria,  
and that the Pirin region did not belong to the country.351 The ECtHR held, 
however, that it is not sufficient that a party is aimed at autonomy or 
secession for it to be contrary to democracy and its dissolution therefore 
automatically justified.352 In a society where rule of law and democracy 
reign, it is essential that political parties are allowed to express their ideas 
about changing the existing order as long as they do it peacefully and 
without challenging democracy itself.353 Even if the statements of the 
members of the party appeared illegitimate and incompatible with the values 
of the current Bulgarian State, that did not make it contrary to democracy.354 
In the present case there was additionally nothing that pointed to the party 
having a real chance to accomplish its goals in a way which would not be 
accepted by all political actors.355 
 
4.2.3.2 Religious Parties 
In Refah, the ECtHR distinguished between three main arguments used by 
the Turkish Constitutional Court to conclude that Refah was a centre for 
activities contrary to the constitution. The Constitutional Court had argued 
that the party intended establish a plurality of legal systems, that it wished to 
introduce sharia and that it was prepared to use violence.356 
 
The ECtHR held that a plurality of legal systems would not be compatible 
with the ECHR. Such a system would mean that the State were no longer 
neutral and impartial, and it would be incompatible with the State’s positive 
obligation to ensure that all within its jurisdiction enjoys the rights and 
freedoms of the ECHR.357 It would also be contrary to the principle of non-
discrimination, as the State would be unable to uphold a fair balance 
between the interests of religious groups wanting to have their own legal 
system and the interest of society as whole.358 
 
The ECtHR has been criticised for this conclusion. Particularly, the ECtHR 
has been accused of having relied on insufficient evidence as to whether the 
plurality of legal systems proposed by Refah would allow individuals to 
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choose a system.359 Likewise, critics have held that the ECtHR assumed that 
the legal orders would be all-encompassing in scope and that the State 
would be unable to neutrally guarantee individual rights and freedoms.360 
Macklem argues that in doing so, the ECtHR protected a liberal conception 
of democracy.361 Although liberalism is not a clear concept itself, it has 
individual liberty at its core and that was the concern of the ECtHR in this 
case.362 
 
If by ‘legal pluralism’ one means ‘the coexistence of two or more legal 
orders within or across the boundaries of a sovereign state’,363 a number of 
European States actually practice formal legal pluralism through differential 
treatment of minority groups.364 The federal system proposed in the 
Socialist Party case365 could be said to constitute a form of legal 
pluralism,366 that the ECtHR apparently found to be compatible with the 
ECHR. However, the ECHR has a strong focus on individual rights, except 
regarding non-discrimination,367 which may require ‘differential treatment 
of “persons who are significantly different”’.368 Scheinin suggests that 
instead of excluding a plurality of religious legal systems generally, the 
ECtHR should have considered the specific elements of such a system. 
What issues would be subject to this plurality, and what human rights 
safeguards would it entail?369 
 
Conversely, one could say that the ECtHR in the Refah case defined what 
type of legal pluralism is compatible with the ECHR.370 Such a system 
would have to meet three essential conditions. The legal pluralism must give 
individuals the opportunity to freely choose which system they want to 
belong to. Furthermore, it must not be to wide in scope and the State must 
remain the neutral guarantor of fundamental rights and freedoms.371 
Macklem asserts that there is an intimate connection between ‘militant 
democracy’ and legal pluralism, shown by the fact that in the Refah case, 
the ‘legality of Turkey’s militant democratic stance (…) rested on the 
illegality of Refah’s proposed model of pluralism’.372 Furthermore, the 
ECtHR imposed the same condition on both a pluralist legal system and a 
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‘militant democracy’, namely that they ensure that democracy can protect 
the rights and freedom of the ECHR.373  
 
Two of the statements by members of parliament explicitly expressed their 
wish to introduce sharia, and one statement referred to ‘the construction of 
an Islamic State’.374 Two statements were more ambiguous, referring to a 
‘just order’375 that were to be established once Refah had come to power, 
and ‘hak nizami’376 (a just order or God’s order), and commending ‘those 
who contribute, with conviction, to the supremacy of Allah’.377 The ECtHR 
considered them, together with other statements of the leaders of Refah, to 
show the objective of the party to set up a sharia system.378 Furthermore, the 
ECtHR stated that sharia is ‘incompatible with the fundamental principles of 
democracy, as set forth in the Convention’.379 The ECtHR regarded sharia 
as ‘stable and invariable’, excluding principles like political pluralism and 
the development of freedoms.380 The ECtHR expressed the follow view: 
 
It is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights 
while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, which 
clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to 
its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of 
women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public 
life in accordance with religious precepts. 
 
The ECtHR pointed out that States may, due to their history, oppose 
political movements founded on religious fundamentalism.381 Turkey had a 
theocratic regime in the past, which was replaced by a democracy to which 
secularism was central. Therefore, the Turkish Constitutional Court could 
legitimately argue that sharia was not compatible with democracy.382 This 
was not considered as contradictory with the establishment of a plurality of 
legal systems.383 
 
The ECtHR has been criticised for too easily dismissing sharia as 
incompatible with democracy. Macklem argues that sharia is complex and 
comprehensive, and although some elements of it are admittedly contrary to 
democracy, others are not.384 According to his view, the ECtHR should thus 
have analysed the sharia system more thoroughly by referring to specific 
rules.385 Boyle observes that sharia has ancient roots and that millions of 
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people only in Europe adheres to Islam; nevertheless, the ECtHR did not 
attempt to distinguish between the practices of the majority of Muslims and 
extremists.386 According to Boyle, it was ‘unnecessary and unhelpful’ that 
the ECtHR pronounced on sharia;387 the ‘broad and seemingly hostile 
formulations’ used in Refah were not supportive of a better understanding of 
the issue.388 In any event, it could have asked for expert advice, which 
would have shown that there is a debate within Islam on sharia, democracy 
and human rights.389 
 
Boyle asserts that the Refah case could be interpreted to mean that ‘peaceful 
advocacy of the tenets of Islam is unprotected’ by the ECHR,390 and holds 
that: 
 
It is difficult to suppress the thought that the endorsement by a 
European-wide court of such a radical intervention in the democratic 
process, as a result of which the choice of a significant percentage of 
the Turkish electorate was removed from power, was influenced by 
the events of “9/11” and the world we have lived in since then.391   
 
Since 9/11, Islamophobia has grown in throughout Europe; however, less 
attention has been given to this phenomenon and the discrimination it entails 
than to for instance anti-Semitism.392 In light of the criticism against the 
judgment, it could be argued that the ECtHR failed to correctly apply its 
case law to ‘the only traditionally Muslim state party to the ECHR’.393 
Instead, Vidmar argues, it referred to ‘clichés and possibly even to language 
offensive to Islam as a religion’.394 In either case, this demonstrates that it is 
difficult to find a common understanding of the meaning of democracy, 
even within a group of States that consider themselves to have a common 
constitutional heritage.395 Vidmar points out that: 
 
[T]he concept of a ‘militant democracy’ enters on somewhat slippery 
terrain when it proclaims those political ideas which do not initially 
stem from certain political ideology but from the religion of 95 per 
cent of the state’s population to be incompatible with a democratic 
society.396 
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It has been argued that Refah is an example of that the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR differs from its conception of democracy (on the premise that it is a 
‘thick, inclusive’ one) in cases under Article 11 ECHR concerning 
religion.397 What would be needed, according to ten Napel, is both a 
political discussion about concepts like ‘pluralism’, and a change in the 
case-law of the ECtHR to become more inclusive when it comes to 
religion.398  
 
4.2.4 Undemocratic Means 
In several cases, the ECtHR has found party programmes to indicate that the 
party did not intend to use undemocratic means. Naturally, this is an 
important indicator in cases where there are no activities or statements that 
could point to the contrary. In the United Communist Party case, the ECtHR 
pointed out that the programme of the TBKP rejected violence as a means 
and rather advocated a political debate.399 Considering the importance for 
democracy of a peaceful dialogue and the freedom of expression, the 
ECtHR stated that a political party could not be dissolved only because it 
engaged in political debate.400 This was also an essential factor in the 
ÖZDEP case, where the party also did not have a chance to start its 
activities before it was dissolved.401  
 
The ECtHR did not find the statements of the Socialist Party leader, where 
he inter alia talked about a Kurdish and a Turkish nation and the 
‘oppression’ of the Kurdish people, to be encouraging violence or 
countering democratic principles.402 In fact, he had underlined the 
importance of adhering to democratic rules and he had also opposed the use 
of violence.403 
 
The ECtHR has repeatedly emphasized that the government may be more 
widely criticized than an individual, and that it is necessary in a democracy 
that the executive is scrutinized from different perspectives.404 Harsh 
criticism of State policy is not the same thing as encouraging violence, 
hatred, revenge or insurrection.405 In Yazar, leaders of the HEP had claimed 
that PKK terrorists were freedom fighters and that security forces did not 
combat terrorists but the Kurdish people.406 However, the party had not 
explicitly endorsed the use of violence as a political means and none of the 
leaders had been convicted for incitement to ethnic hatred or insurrection.407 
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In the view of the ECtHR, these could not in themselves make the HEP 
comparable to violent armed groups.408 If merely defending the principles 
advocated by the party would amount to supporting terrorism, the possibility 
of handling these questions in a democratic manner would diminish and 
would give violent groups monopoly on defending these principles.409 This 
would be contrary to the spirit of Article 11 and the democratic principles it 
is based on.410 Likewise, in HADEP and Demir, the ECtHR held that calling 
the fight against terrorism, carried out by Turkish security forces in part of 
the country, a ‘dirty war’, did not make the party comparable to violent 
groups.411  
 
The Yazar case can be contrasted with the DEP case, where the ECtHR 
found that one speech of a former leader to the party to endorse and incite to 
the use of violence as a political means.412 The former leader had inter alia 
expressed the message that the armed movement of the PKK was 
comparable to a liberation war in the north of Kurdistan, and that the 
militants of the PKK who had been killed during this armed conflict had 
sacrificed themselves for Kurdish independence.413 The speech had also 
aimed to stigmatize particularly the Turkish government by calling it the 
‘enemy’ who indiscriminately kills Kurds without distinguishing between 
the PKK and other people.414 In the light of the tense situation in south-east 
Turkey at the time of the speech, the ECtHR found that such formulations 
were likely to incite hatred and give the impression that violence is 
necessary and justified.415 The ECtHR thus held that regarding this 
statement of the former DEP leader, the interference met a pressing social 
need.416 
 
The ECtHR found in the Refah case that the statements by Refah’s members 
were ambiguous as to the means that should be used to gain political 
influence.417 Refah’s chairman, for instance, had advocated for the 
introduction of Islamic law and asked whether the change would be violent 
or peaceful.418 A member of the parliament had held that jihad had to be 
‘waged by an army’.419 Another parliament member had said that ‘blood 
will flow’ if attempts were made to close down religious colleges.420 
Whatever ‘jihad’ was taken to mean, the relevant speeches were found to 
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refer to the legitimate use of force.421 Moreover, Refah had not distanced 
itself from statements of its members endorsing the use of force.422 
 
In the Herri Batasuna and Batasuna case, the ECtHR observed that: 
• Party leaders had used slogans supporting ETA prisoners and 
threatening expressions (‘struggle is the only way’, ‘you, the 
Fascists, are the real terrorists’, ‘long live ETA military’) at a 
demonstration in 2002.423 
• A Batasuna representative had said that ETA was not in favour of 
violence because of ‘the fun of it’, but because it believed that the 
use of ‘every means possible’ was necessary.424 
• A Batasuna councillor had participated in a demonstration 
supporting ETA.425 
• Towns were the two parties were in power had made ETA terrorists 
honorary citizens.426 
• The Batasuna had used an anagram of the association ‘Gestoras Pro-
Amnistía’, which was illegal and mentioned on the European list of 
terrorist organisations.427 
The ECtHR held that this evidence was close to ‘explicit support’ for the 
use of force and the support of people connected to terrorism.428 It was also 
possible that it might fuel ‘social conflict between supporters of the 
applicant parties and other political organisations’.429 The Spanish courts 
had thus ‘sufficiently established that the climate of confrontation created 
by the applicant parties risked provoking intense reaction in society capable 
of disrupting public order, as has been the case in the past’.430  
 
The failure to condemn the use of force in the light of the long-lasting 
presence of terrorism in the country, which had been condemned by all 
other political parties, implied support for terrorism.431 The link between the 
two parties and ETA could thus ‘objectively be considered to constitute a 
threat to democracy’.432 The ECtHR also took into account that the 
conclusions of the Supreme Court were a reaction to the ‘concern to 
universally condemn justification for terrorism’, as expressed by several 
documents issued by the EU and Council of Europe organs.433 Moreover, 
the national court had not only based its conclusion on this, but rather found 
it to be part of repeated and severe acts which together with the absence of 
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condemnation of violence amounted to an accommodation of terrorism.434 
In this context the ECtHR observed that also omissions by political actors 
may point to his or her opinions.435 The ECtHR therefore found that the 
Spanish Courts had reached ‘reasonable conclusions’ after a thorough 
examination of the evidence.436 The acts and statements which were 
attributable to the two political parties provided a ‘clear picture of a model 
of society conceived and advocated by them, which is incompatible with the 
concept of a “democratic society”’.437 The dissolution of the parties did thus 
meet a pressing social need.438 
 
4.2.5 Internal Democracy of Political Parties: 
The Missing Piece? 
What is evidently absent from the above, is any consideration of the internal 
democracy of political parties. Thus, it appears that the ECtHR and PACE 
have slightly different view on what should be afforded weight. PACE has 
not explicitly held that it should be a factor in the assessment of political 
parties. However, it has held that internal democracy is important for 
democracy as it affects the representativity of elected bodies,439 and pointed 
out that extremist parties often are internally undemocratic.440 
 
Mersel has suggested that the internal democracy of a political party should 
be taken into account in the dissolution process. Like PACE, Mersel notes 
the important representative role of political parties.441 As parties are the 
vehicles ensuring that individuals can take part in democracy, the same 
rights should apply to them within those entities.442 Mersel also seems to be 
in agreement with PACE that externally undemocratic parties are often 
internally undemocratic. The question is then if such a party can really be 
seen as externally undemocratic, as its internal opinions must in the end also 
affect the external actions of the party.443 
 
However, Mersel also recognizes that, apart from impairing the 
functionality of parties, requiring political parties to be internally 
democratic would interfere with the freedom of association and right to 
autonomy of the party.444 Likewise, the members of a party have chosen to 
be a part of it, exercising their freedom of association.445 Other 
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counterarguments focus on, for instance, that political parties would become 
less pluralistic.446 
 
Mersel concludes that internal democracy should not only be taken into 
account in dissolution cases, but also that there should be a possibility to 
enforce it through dissolution.447 However, ‘internal democracy’ should be 
narrowly defined and enforced by a court or another neutral institution.448 
Requirements should be confined to ‘minimum democracy’:449  
 
These essentials may include: equal rights of participation and voting 
for members; open and regular elections for party leadership and party 
offices; freedom of speech and association within the party; and a 
right to information and transparency.450 
 
So far, there are no signs that ECtHR intends to incorporate the factor of 
internal democracy into its case law. Instead, having found that the 
dissolution of a political party corresponds to a pressing social need, the 
ECtHR presently moves on to assess the proportionality of the measure.  
 
4.3 Proportionality 
The pressing social need must also be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued’.451 The dissolution of a political party is a severe measure, 
especially when it is immediate, permanent, the assets of the party 
confiscated and its leaders banned from political life.452 As the dissolution 
of an entire party thus may only be taken in the most serious cases, the 
nature and severity of the interference also has to be considered in the 
proportionality assessment.453 In cases where the parties have been 
dissolved so early that it is not possible to compare the party’s programme 
with the actions taken and positions defended,454 the ECtHR has described 
the dissolution as a penalty for merely exercising the freedom of 
expression.455  
 
The ECtHR has acknowledged that the context of the case, such as for 
example the struggle against terrorism, might affect the outcome.456 
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However, in most cases, there has not been sufficient evidence to show that 
the party had contributed to terrorism.457  
 
In Yazar, the ECtHR considered that a single speech held in another 
language than Turkish by a former leader of the party abroad, for an 
audience not directly affected by the situation at hand, could not have more 
than a very limited impact on ‘national security’, ‘public order’ or the 
‘territorial integrity’ of Turkey. As this speech alone could not justify the 
dissolution of an entire party, the interference was not proportional in 
relation to the aims pursued. The dissolution of the DEP was not necessary 
in a democratic society and there had been a violation of Article 11 
ECHR.458 
 
In Refah, the ECtHR had concluded that the interference with the 
applicants’ rights and freedoms under Article 11 did meet a pressing social 
need.459 Although the dissolution of a political party and the exclusion of its 
leaders from political life were severe and drastic measures, the ECtHR did 
not find anything that made the interference disproportionate to the aims 
pursued. The ban of the leaders was temporary and concerned a limited 
number of parliament members (three of which were applicants in the 
present case, but who were partly responsible for the party’s dissolution). 
The economic loss of the applicants did not affect the proportionality 
assessment. As the interference thus met a pressing social need and was not 
disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, there had in conclusion not 
been a violation of Article 11 ECHR.460 
 
As the views of the political parties’ in the Herri Batasuna and Batasuna 
case were incompatible with democracy and constituted a ‘considerable 
threat’ to democracy, the dissolution was also ‘proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued’, namely public safety, the prevention of disorder 
and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It was consequently 
necessary in a democratic society and there had been no violation of Article 
11 ECHR.461 
 
4.4 Abuse of Rights 
The prohibition of abuse in Article 17 ECHR has two purposes. It aims to 
make sure that the ECHR is not used to for instance incite anti-Semitism in 
the way done by the Nazis in connection with WWII. 462 This could indicate 
that the drafters did not have a procedural view on democracy.463 
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Furthermore, its purpose is to prevent States from trying to undermine the 
ECHR.  
 
Article 17 has to be connected with at least one of the rights and freedoms 
set out in Section I ECHR or its Protocols.464 Arguably, there is a value in 
considering the question of Article 17 with the merits, as the applicability of 
it to a large extent depends on the substance of the case.465 However, the 
EComHR and the ECtHR has not consistently done so.466 In the United 
Communist Party, the ECtHR held that the assessment under Article 11(2) 
ECHR had to be done first in order to decide whether Article 17 would be 
applicable or not.467 It could thus be said that the ECtHR did not treat 
Article 17 separately, as that would be inconsistent with the more general 
goals of the ECHR, namely to promote free expression and association.468 
This would also be consistent with the general rule in international law that 
a provision is to be interpreted in light of the context and objectives of the 
treaty.469 
 
It is worth noting that the outcome in United Communist Party was different 
from the one in the German Communist Party case. This may be because of 
the fall of the Soviet Union, although the difference in the size and 
importance of the two parties might have played a role.470 The ECtHR also 
noted, with respect to Article 17 ECHR, that the two parties were very 
different. The United Communist Party was found to fulfil democratic 
requirements and nothing in its programme showed that it intended to use 
the ECHR to destroy the rights and freedoms of others.471 
 
In cases connected to Article 17, the ECtHR has taken three different 
approaches. Firstly, the Commission introduced the method to use elements 
of Article 17 to limit substantive provisions.472 This method does not appear 
to have been used in party dissolution cases. 
 
Secondly, it has used Article 17 to deny applicants’ the protection of rights 
under ECHR. This does not mean that the applicant loses all its rights but 
only the one that is abused.473 In 1957, the EComHR declared inadmissible 
an application by the German Communist Party, which had been dissolved 
by the German Federal Constitutional Court a year earlier. The Commission 
referred to Article 17, observing that this ‘fundamental provision’ intended 
                                                
464 Pieter van Dijk and others (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (4th edn, Intersentia 2006) 1084. 
465 ibid 1086.  
466 German Communist Party v the Federal Republic of Germany App No 250/57 
(Commission Decision, 20 July 1957); Refah Partisi (n 156) paras 136-137. 
467 United Communist Party (n 54) para 32. 
468 Fox and Nolte (n 15) 424. 
469 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331, art 31(1); 
Fox and Nolte (n 15) 424. 
470 Boyle (n 19) 9. 
471 United Communist Party (n 54) para 54. 
472 van Dijk and others (n 464) 1085-86. 
473 ibid 1088. 
 56 
to ‘safeguard’ the rights of the ECHR ‘protecting the free operation of 
democratic institutions’. The Commission cited the travaux préparatoires, 
according to which ‘it is necessary to prevent totalitarian currents from 
exploiting, in their own interests, the principles enunciated by the 
Convention; that is, from invoking the freedom in order to suppress Human 
Rights’. The Commission found that it was clear that the party aimed to 
‘establish a socialist-communist system by means of a proletarian revolution 
and the dictatorship of the proletariat’. As a dictatorship would destroy 
rights or freedoms in ECHR, it was incompatible with it.474 The German 
Communist Party case should not be interpreted as considering restrictions 
on undemocratic parties so obviously legitimate that there was no need for 
any threshold of proof. The case was the first one where the Commission 
was to deal with the dissolution of a party, and the German Communist 
Party was exactly such a party that the drafters had in mind when they 
formulated Article 17.475 
 
In Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v the Netherlands, the applicants held 
leading positions in a political party, Nederlandse Volks Unie (NVU), 
which had been prohibited by the Regional Court of Amsterdam. The first 
applicant had been convicted for distributing leaflets for the NVU, which 
were found to be inciting racial discrimination. Both applicants were on a 
list of candidates for municipal council elections, which was found to 
belong to the prohibited party and consequently was declared invalid.476 The 
EComHR stated that ‘the general purpose of Article 17 is to prevent 
totalitarian groups from exploiting in their own interests the principles 
enunciated’ by the ECHR.477 It applies mainly to rights that may be used to 
justify activities intended to harm other rights and freedoms of the ECHR.478 
The Commission found that the NVU had aims that were incompatible with 
the ECHR. The party advocated the removal of all ‘non-white people from 
the Netherlands’ territory, in complete disregard of their nationality, time of 
residence, family ties, as well as social, economic, humanitarian or other 
considerations’. The policy of the party thus clearly promoted racial 
discrimination, inconsistent with inter alia Article 14 ECHR.479 As the 
activities of the applicants thus fell within the scope of Article 17, they 
could not complain under Article 10 ECHR or Article 3 of the First Protocol 
to ECHR.480  
 
                                                
474 German Communist Party (n 466) 1-2, 4, 5.  
475 Fox and Nolte (n 15) 423.  
476 Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v the Netherlands App Nos 8348/78, 8406/78 
(Commission Decision, 11 October 1979) paras 189-190. 
477 ibid para 195. Similarly, in Zdanoka (n 157) para 99, the ECtHR held that there is a risk 
that individuals of groups will attempt to use the ECHR in order to destroy the rights and 
freedoms contained in it; this is why Article 17 was introduced. 
478 Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek (n 476) para 195. 
479 ibid. 
480 Although the applicants did not formally candidate on behalf of NVU, they did not 
dissociate themselves from the party but on the contrary stated that they still wanted to 
advance the objetives of the NVU. See Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek (n 476) paras 196-
197.  
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Thirdly, the ECtHR has chosen to only assess the case under the substantive 
provisions and not made use of Article 17. In cases where the substantive 
provision has a limitation clause, like for instance Article 11, Article 17 
seems to be ‘absorbed’ by that clause.481 In a number of cases, the ECtHR 
simply stated that it had not been shown that the party in question intended 
to harm the rights and freedoms enshrined in the ECHR so that Article 17 
came into play.482 In the Refah case, neither the majority of the Chamber nor 
the Grand Chamber discussed Article 17. As the ECtHR found that the 
dissolution was justified and that the party might have other objectives than 
the ones found in its programme, it might be argued that the ECtHR should 
at least have explained why Article 17 was not applicable.483 Furthermore, 
the arguments against Refah suggest that it would be logic to conclude that 
the party was indeed aiming at the destruction of the rights and freedoms of 
others.484 In any case, it remains unclear what would be required for the 
ECtHR to separately examine Article 17 in those cases.485 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has focused on the conditions applied by the ECtHR when 
assessing the legality of the dissolution of a political party. At first sight, the 
ECtHR applies quite a rigorous test in those cases. However, several of the 
elements of that test appear to be more or less problematic. The Refah case 
has been criticised for setting an evidence standard that is too low for this 
type of cases, risking an excessively wide margin of appreciation as a result. 
 
Furthermore, looking at the substantive criteria, the size and popularity of a 
party seems to affect the assessment of whether there was a sufficiently 
established and imminent danger to democracy. However, that criteria was 
not applied in the Batasuna case.  
 
As concerns whether the party’s aims are undemocratic or not, it is quite 
clear that advocating self-determination or criticizing the State’s methods to 
combat terrorism are not signs of undemocratic aims. In this regard, it is not 
certain what would constitute an undemocratic aim. The ECtHR touched 
upon the issue only very briefly in the Batasuna case. Regarding parties 
with religious aims, however, the ECtHR has clearly stated that introducing 
sharia law would be contrary to democracy. Establishing a plurality of legal 
systems could perhaps be possible if it was limited in scope, ensured that 
individuals would choose which system they would belong to and that the 
State remained neutral. The ECtHR has been criticised for setting a double 
standard towards Islam compared to other religions, and for not having 
examined the issue thoroughly enough. 
 
                                                
481 van Dijk and others (n 464) 1089-90. 
482 Socialist Party (n 164) para 53; ÖZDEP (n 164) para 47. 
483 Boyle (n 19) 10.  
484 ibid. 
485 Dijk and others (n 464) 1090. 
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The meaning of ‘undemocratic means’ is perhaps even more unclear. It is 
clear that violence constitutes an undemocratic method and, at the other end 
of the spectrum, that serious criticism of the State does not. However, the 
statements that have been considered as supportive of violence are at times 
quite similar to the ones that have not. The ECtHR seems to draw a very 
fine line between the two types of statements.  Moreover, it is unclear 
whether undemocratic aims could mean something else than violence or 
support for violence. 
 
The ECtHR has not considered the internal organization of political parties 
in its assessment of whether they are undemocratic or not. There are 
important arguments both for and against the inclusion of such a criteria. 
The question is if the ECtHR needs one more criteria to elaborate upon, or 
whether it is perhaps more desirable that it focuses on clarifying the ones 
currently being used. 
 
The proportionality assessment has in dissolution cases often not been 
elaborated much upon. It seems that, apart form the nature and severity of 
the measure (for instance whether the dissolution was immediate and 
permanent), and the context in the particular country, the impact of the 
action or statement found to meet a pressing social need may also affect the 
outcome. 
 
Lastly, it appears that the ECtHR has, contrary to the EComHR, chosen not 
to make use of Article 17 ECHR at all in party dissolution cases. As the 
ECtHR in the relatively recent Refah case did not even explain why the 
provision was not applicable, it seems doubtful if the ECtHR adheres to its 
principle from the United Communist Party case that Article 17 should be 
assessed after Article 11.  
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5 Conclusions 
Not that surprisingly perhaps, to a large extent there appears to be an 
agreement as to what the concept of democracy entails among the Council 
of Europe institutions. It is clear that democracy is the only political system 
compatible with the Council of Europe; in this respect the European system 
appears to go much further than international law in general. Furthermore, 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law are seen as practically 
inseparable. Likewise it is clear that the type of democracy considered is 
characterized by a tolerant pluralism that includes all kinds of ideas in its 
sphere. Without making an overly strict classification of the European 
democracy, its conception arguably goes well beyond a procedural model. 
However, the strongest consensus still seems to concern elections. Largely 
by virtue of the work of the Venice Commission, there are quite detailed 
standards surrounding the electoral area. Likewise, there is a strong 
consensus among the institutions as to the general principles for the 
dissolution of parties.  
 
The institutions of the Council of Europe clearly all acknowledge that it 
may be legitimate to dissolve a political party under exceptional 
circumstances. They also appear to be in agreement about the principles that 
should govern the dissolution process. As dissolution is a particularly severe 
measure, it has to be applied restrictively and as a last resort. Furthermore, 
both PACE and the Venice Commission have emphasized that the judiciary 
has an important role to play in those cases. However, only the Commission 
appears to consider that also political considerations should be taken into 
account before starting a judicial process. PACE and ECtHR both seem to 
have been silent on the issue.  
 
In my view, Bligh and Macklem seem to be right that the threats to 
democracy have indeed changed. Their conclusion is supported by the fact 
that right-wing extremist groups and parties have been depicted as the 
largest threat to democracy today. These are groups that oppose certain 
democratic principles and values but that do not necessarily reject 
democracy as a system; on the contrary, they use it for their own benefits. 
Perhaps those changes in society are also why the ECtHR has been 
criticised for its position when it comes to secularism. Culture and religion 
are seen as ‘challenges’ to democracy in formerly homogenous societies that 
are today culturally diverse. Applying the principle of secularism is one 
answer, but using such a broad, elusive concept risks missing the point and 
give rise to suspicions about double standards. Arguably those two 
phenomena are sides of the same coin. On the one hand, we have right-wing 
extremist movements that often are reacting to a new, culturally diverse, 
society, with intolerance and racism. On the other hand, we have for 
instance the ECtHR, which also in a way reacts to a changed society but at 
the same time struggles to uphold democratic values.  
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It seems that the ECtHR for the most part does adhere to the principles of 
the conception of democracy within the Council of Europe. The few number 
of cases where the ECtHR has found dissolution to be legitimate suggests 
that it indeed does apply Article 11(2) restrictively. It is in my view possible 
to discern a development in the ECtHR’s case law when it comes to what 
aims are considered compatible with democracy. In the early cases, the 
ECtHR seemed quite reluctant to admit that the parties in question 
advocated for instance a right to secession. In its later case law, the ECtHR 
has explicitly said that promoting self-determination, secession or minority 
rights is not in itself contrary to democratic principles. 
 
In the Refah case, however, it could be questioned if the ECtHR really has 
given effective meaning to the principle of plurality that it values so highly. 
It is of course detrimental to the legitimacy of the ECtHR that it is implicitly 
accused of being Islamophobic and that a Muslim party felt obliged to 
withdraw its application from the ECtHR on this ground. It would probably 
be possible to write a thesis on the Refah case alone; for the purposes of this 
one, however, I will simply maintain that it affirms my conclusion above. At 
the core of the problem is how the ECtHR conceives of the world and how it 
defines democracy. It is really about another classic dilemma – that of the 
judge. In the end, they are also humans, and the point is not that they should 
not be, but that they should be aware of it. The criticism suggests that the 
ECtHR would perhaps have come to different conclusions, had it analysed 
the subject a little deeper.  
 
Furthermore, some issues remain unclear. The ECtHR seemingly is very 
reluctant to use Article 17 in party dissolution cases. It remains uncertain in 
what situation it would be applied today. Perhaps it would take a party 
similar like the KPD that explicitly reject democracy as a whole, or that is as 
overtly racist and discriminatory as the NVU. 
 
Moreover, there are tendencies within the ‘political’ institutions of the 
Council of Europe to acknowledge the importance of culture to democracy. 
The ECtHR does not appear to have taken this into account in party 
dissolution cases. Perhaps it would be helpful to acknowledge this aspect of 
this type of cases; not only in religious cases. Even in cases concerning for 
instance parties advocating the right to secession from a State, there is 
cultural aspect. That party arguably sees itself as belonging to another 
culture (in the widest meaning of the word) than the dominant culture of the 
State; thus it wants to secede. Assuming that the ECtHR might in the future 
have to deal with cases concerning right-wing extremist parties, advocating 
for instance the exclusion of immigrants, the connection is even more 
apparent. Perhaps it turns out to be irrelevant; my point is merely that it 
might be useful to reflect on it, especially in the light of the emerging view 
of the Council of Europe.  
 
Additionally, it seems that the ECtHR performs a very delicate balancing 
act in assessing what activities amount to support for violence. It is clear 
that merely advocating the same principles as a terrorist group does not 
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make one a supporter of violence. But in my view there is not a significant 
difference between the statements in for instance Yazar and DEP. It seems 
that it is not only a question of what the party has said but also about 
whether there is a repeated use of similar statements. Furthermore, it is 
unclear if there are any other undemocratic means, or if it should actually be 
taken to mean violence. This is perhaps the one issue where the views of the 
different Council of Europe institutions diverge the most from each other. 
The Venice Commission takes the strictest view, that only violence or 
support for it can justify the dissolution of a party. PACE and the ECtHR 
seem to have almost the same opinion, that having undemocratic means are 
sufficient. The Venice Commission has itself admitted that its standard is 
stricter than the one set out by the ECtHR. Perhaps the view of the 
Commission should simply be looked at as ‘good practices’ whereas the 
view of the ECtHR represents the minimum standards. In either case, I 
would assert that the position of the Venice Commission could be 
questioned. Let us return for a moment to the classic problem that a party 
uses entirely democratic means in order to abolish democracy once it has 
come to power. Applying the ‘best practices’ of the Venice Commission 
would mean that the State could not dissolve that party. It would perhaps 
have other means to combat it, but if they were inefficient, the democracy 
would in the end be forced to commit suicide like the Weimar republic once 
did. 
 
The question remains, however, what could constitute undemocratic means, 
apart from violence. Would a party that actively uses discrimination in its 
internal structure be considered as using undemocratic means? This is 
opposed by the fact that the ECtHR has not so far considered the internal 
structure of political parties to be of relevance in those cases. This is also an 
area where the view of the ECtHR seems to slightly differ from at least the 
view of PACE. It is of course possible that internal democracy should only 
be viewed as ‘good practices’ and nothing more. But it is hard to disregard 
the argument that the fact that a party does not apply democracy internally 
does say something about that party’s commitment to democracy. Perhaps 
Mersel’s suggestion that it should be a factor that alone could justify the 
dissolution of a political party is lowering the standard set by the ECtHR too 
much. But as an additional criteria in the assessment of the legality of a 
dissolution measure it could be useful. However, considering the varying 
practice in the Member States, it is perhaps not very likely that the ECtHR 
will impose such a criteria on political parties.  
 
The same is probably true for the argument that, in the light of international 
law, it should in fact be a duty on the part of the State to dissolve parties that 
promote racism, xenophobia and intolerance. But perhaps the ECtHR will 
some time in the future have to deal with allegations that a State violated the 
ECHR because it has failed to dissolve a party that for instance harmed the 
rights of others through discrimination.  
 
In conclusion, a clear answer to the research question is not possible to 
provide. And it would perhaps be naïve to expect that, in the light of the 
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elusive character of the notion ‘democracy’. The institutions of the Council 
of Europe have repeatedly stated that there is not one model of democracy 
that suits all States. Yet, Article 11(2) ECHR requires that restrictions to the 
freedom of associations are ‘necessary in a democratic society’. As Petman 
noted, this forces the ECtHR to choose a model of society. In my view, 
there are two sides to this. On the one hand, it means that the application of 
the article will be extremely difficult, as there is no clear definition of what 
the requirements of a democratic society are. Additionally, the problem is 
not much clarified by the use of equally elusive principles like pluralism and 
secularism. This entails a risk that the outcome will differ from the 
conception of democracy in the Member States – and all the more so 
considering the variations in national legislation. On the other hand, it is 
difficult to see what the alternative would be. Because – and this is the 
starting point of this thesis – the requirements of democracy is the core of 
the issue and the framework for the assessment.  
 
From what I have argued so far, one could of course reply that the ECtHR 
all in all has applied Article 11(2) according to the principles it has set out. 
The questionable reasoning in the Refah case could be seen as not 
depending on an unclear conception of democracy, but rather an out-dated 
view on Islam. However, I would still maintain that a clarification, to the 
extent it is feasible, of the concept of democracy is desirable not least for the 
sake of foreseeability. How that should be done is a question that needs to 
be further examined. The ECtHR is an independent organ that should 
perhaps itself try to define democracy more concretely. But it is arguably 
not helpful that the Committee of Ministers appears to be so reluctant to 
elaborate on the issue, especially when PACE has repeatedly addressed the 
issue and the Venice Commission is prepared to contribute. Perhaps it 
would not be necessary to settle on one definition that would encompass all 
States. The Venice Commission has great experience in working with 
different kinds of democratic systems; a start could be to examine what 
different sorts of models are represented within the Council of Europe 
Members States. The Commission cautioned that democratic guidelines 
would inevitably be minimum standards. In this case, that could at least 
provide a good starting point. In fact, it might even be the most suitable 
form for such guidelines in order to ensure respect for the diversity of 
democratic systems within the Council of Europe and in order to avoid 
‘democratic legitimism’.  
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